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History and Interpretation of the 
Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh 
ERIC KADES 
At the root of most land titles in America outside the original thirteen col-
onies sits a federal patent. The validity of government title, in turn, rests 
on "[t]he great case of Johnson v. M'Intosh," 1 which held that a discover-
ing sovereign has the exclusive right to extinguish Indians' interests in their 
lands, either by purchase or just war. Yet both legal and historical scholar-
ship on this "great case" is surprisingly thin. There are no studies examin-
ing the litigants or the actual acreage under dispute (surprising for a real 
property dispute). There are also a number of unanswered legal questions 
surrounding Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in M'Intosh, perhaps none 
more glaring than the failure to pin down the legal basis for the decision. 
This article endeavors to fill in these gaps. 
M'Intosh involved conflicting claims to large tracts of land in southern 
Illinois and Indiana. The plaintiffs made their claim under deeds obtained 
directly from the Indians by predecessors organized as the United Illinois 
1. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1954), citing Johnson v. 
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). In the opinion itself, Chief Justice Marshall ad-
verted to the "magnitude of the interest in [this] litigation." Ibid., 604. A prominent nation-
al newspaper reported in only a short paragraph the outcome of a closely watched Kentucky 
land title case, Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), but devoted an entire column 
to Johnson v. M'lntosh: "from the great importance of the subject matter in controversy, 
[Johnson v. M'lntosh] seems to require rather a more detailed notice than it is usual, or even 
possible, in general to take of questions argued before [the Supreme Court]." Niles' Regis-
ter (Baltimore), March 28, 1823, at 3 (vol 24, no. 1). The article goes on to laud Marshall's 
opinion as "one of the most luminous and satisfactory opinions we recollect ever to have 
listened to ... " 
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Map of Land Claims in Johnson v. M'lntosh 
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D Township Containing Mcintosh Purchase of 1819 (not at issue in case) 
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and Wabash Land Companies. The defendant countered with supposedly 
conflicting claims to some of the same land under a United States patent. 
In ruling for the defendant, Chief Justice Marshall once and for all estab-
lished that the federal government would not recognize private purchases 
of Indian lands. 
Drawing on material from a variety of sources that neither historians 
nor legal scholars have examined, this article uncovers a number of sur-
prises. The (victorious) defendant's purchases may well have been illegal. 
The driving force behind the litigation was probably the plaintiffs' lawyer, 
Robert Goodloe Harper. Finally, there likely was no real conflict between 
the litigants' land claims. 
Part 1 presents a detailed history of the events leading up to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh. Part 2 offers novel solutions to a 
number of puzzles in Chief Justice Marshall's somewhat obtuse and cryp-
tic opinion. Previous scholarship has passed over Marshall's refusal to 
decide the case based on narrow statutory grounds, despite courts' usual 
preference for such limited rules of decision. This article explains some of 
the subtleties of the system of dual, coexistent land tenure (Indian along-
side European) that Marshall constructed. For instance, Marshall implic-
itly suggested that the plaintiffs, as purchasers from the Indians, look to 
Indian courts for a remedy (a disingenuous suggestion, since Marshall must 
have known no such courts existed and that the tribes lacked the wealth to 
pay damages). Although Marshall's dual tenure land regime did significant-
ly limit their property rights, descriptions of Indian title as a "tenancy at 
sufferance" are patently inaccurate as a matter of law and misleading as a 
matter of fact. Finally, the most astonishing gap in existing legal scholar-
ship on Johnson v. M'Intosh is the failure to identify the legal basis for Chief 
Justice Marshall's holding. As mentioned above, Marshall declined to base 
his holding narrowly on a colonial-era statute (or a royal proclamation) that 
appeared controlling. Though sometimes classified as a constitutional law 
case, the opinion does not cite the Constitution once. Marshall cited a few 
cases, but these clearly did not control the holding. This article argues that 
Marshall appealed to custom-the longstanding European and American 
practice of barring private purchases of Indian land-to provide the rule 
of decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh. 
Part 3 introduces a new interpretation of the purpose of the M'Intosh 
rule: it served as a means of expropriating Indian land at minimal cost. Just 
as sellers can charge more when they are monopolists without competitors, 
so too buyers can pay less when they are monopsonists without compet-
ing bidders. The rule of Johnson v. M'Intosh ensured that Europeans would 
not transfer wealth to the tribes in the process of competing against each 
other to buy land. This part concludes by showing that a number of other 
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important nineteenth-century American legal rules similarly were designed 
to enable the nation to separate Indians from their land cheaply; Johnson 
v. M'Intosh was part and parcel of a complex, multifaceted machine of 
efficient expropriation.2 
I. The History of Johnson v. M'Intosh 
A. Land Title and Alienability in Early America 
M'Intosh is about the nature oflndian land title in general and, in particu-
lar, the effect of United States law on sales by natives to private European 
citizens. Thus the history of the case naturally begins with English and 
American laws governing alienation of land.3 
For the most part, colonists simply imported English real property law, 
wholesale, to define their rights in American lands. Two complications, 
however, demanded the creation of additional rules. First, competing Eu-
ropean sovereigns had to establish rules to deal with conflicting claims 
among themselves to American lands. Second, the European colonizers had 
to decide what rights, if any, Indians had to their own lands. 
The simultaneous British, French, Dutch, Spanish, and even Swedish 
explorations and colonizations of North America inevitably led to land 
disputes. 
[A]s they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in 
order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, 
to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as thl! law by which 
the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as be-
tween themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to the govern-
ment by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all oth-
er European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.4 
It is important to note that, strictly speaking, this discovery rule applied 
only among European nations ("regulated as between themselves"). Some 
commentators have used the term "discovery rule" to describe the rules that 
the various European sovereigns established for defining Indian land rights, 
such as the M'Intosh rule that the sovereign alone could purchase land from 
2. I discuss this law and economics interpretation of Johnson v. M'Intosh and a host of 
other European and American legal rules at greater length in "The Dark Side of Efficiency: 
Johnson v. M'lntosh and The Expropriation of Indian Lands," University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 148 (2000): (1065-1190). 
3. Given the colonizers' superior might, Indian rules governing land transactions had lit-
tle impact on transactions between the two sides. 
4. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 573. 
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the natives. Milner Ball cogently explains why this is inconsistent with 
Marshall's approach: "The theory [of M'Intosh] sets out two different re-
lationships: one among European claimants to the New World, the other 
between each of the European claimants and the Indian inhabitants. As 
among the Europeans, the doctrine of discovery obtained. As between 
European and Indian nations, each relationship was to be separately regu-
lated." The discovery doctrine did not apply, at least directly, to Europe-
an-Indian relations. 5 
Confusion about this two-level doctrine (the discovery rule to regulate 
inter-European disputes and rules to regulate European-Indian disputes) 
may be due in part to the following dense passage in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion. "The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to 
the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from 
the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which 
no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for them-
selves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented." Describing 
the "sole right of acquiring the soil" as a necessary result of the discovery 
rule is misleading. Marshall meant that a discovering nation could exclude 
other nations under the first level, the inter-European discovery rule. The 
discovery rule does not dictate what rule each sovereign chose at the sec-
ond level in defining rights vis-a-vis the Indians. Thus the quoted passage 
did not mean that each sovereign had to bar its own citizens from making 
private purchases of land from the Indians, the particular second-level rule 
that Marshall found that America and its predecessors had adopted. Indeed, 
contrary to the rule of M 'Intosh, it appears that the French at times per-
mitted their colonists to purchase lands directly from the Indians. 
Marshall's very next sentence makes clear the distinction between the 
discovery rule as level one and whatever rules each nation decided to es-
tablish as level two: "Those relations which were to exist between the dis-
coverer and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves [step two]. The 
rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose be-
tween them [step one, the discovery rule]."6 
5. Milner S. Ball, "Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes," American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal 3 ( 1987): 24. Other scholars have made the same point. See Mark Frank Lindley, 
The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1926), 29; J. Youngblood Henderson, "Unraveling the Riddle of Aborig-
inal Title," American Indian Law Review 5 ( 1977): 75, 90; John Hurley, "Aboriginal Rights, 
The Constitution and the Marshall Court," Revu Juridique Thioretique 17 ( 1982-83): 403, 
418; Harold Berman, "The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the 
United States," Buffalo Law Review 27 (1978): 637 , 644. 
6. Johnson v. M'/ntosh, 573; Clarence W. Alvord, The Illinois Country, 1673-1818, Cen-
tennial History of Illinois I (1920; reprint, Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965), 206 
(documenting private purchases from Indians under French rule in Illinois). The United 
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The earliest settlers articulated a simple, selfish step-two doctrine: they 
declared that the Indians had no rights to their own land. Despite an initial 
period of weakness, when colonial Virginia was no military match for the 
local tribes and indeed depended on their charity to survive, Governor 
Harvey articulated a theoretical basis for expropriating Indian lands. 
Some affirm, and it is likely to be true, that these savages have no particular 
propriety in any part or parcel of that country, but only a general residency 
there, as wild beasts in the forest; for they range and wander up and down 
the country without any law or government, being led only by their own lusts 
and sensuality. There is not meum and tuum [mine and thine) amongst them. 
So that if the whole land should be taken from them, there is not a man that 
can complain of any particular wrong done unto him. 
Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts Colony invoked the Bible in support 
of this principle, although he generously offered to leave the Indians with 
enough land to maintain themselves. 
The whole earth is the lords Garden & he hath given it to the sonnes of men, 
w'h a general Condicion, Gen: 1.28. Increase & multiply, replenish the earth 
& subdue it. ... And for the Natives of New England they inclose noe land 
neither have any settled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land 
by, & soe have noe other but a natural! right to those countries Soe as if we 
leave them sufficient for their use wee may lawfully take the rest, ther being 
more than enough for them & us .. . 
In the eyes of the Puritans, hunter-gatherers were not really occupants of 
their lands. "God had intended his land to be cultivated and not to be left 
in the condition of 'that unmanned wild Country, which they [the savag-
es] range rather than inhabit. "'7 
Although they replaced religion with appeals to "civilization," later 
American leaders continued to defend their right to take land from hunt-
ers and put it to agricultural or other more intense use. In an 1802 speech 
honoring the Pilgrims, future President John Quincy Adams would leave 
Illinois and Wabash Land Companies, An Account of Proceedings of the Illinois and Oua-
bache [Wabash] Land Companies (Philadelphia: Young, 1796), iii (Early American Imprints, 
I st series, no. 30,618 [hereafter United Companies, I 796 Memorial]) (averment that French 
land records in Illinois included private purchases from tribes). 
7. Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses 
of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 211 (quoting Governor Harvey); 
John Winthrop, Conclusions for the Plantation in New England, cited in Albert K. Wein-
berg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 74; Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, 
Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: Norton, 1976), 80, citing Samuel Pur-
chas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pi/grimes (London, 1625), 4: 1814. 
The Great Case of Johnson v. M 'Intosh 73 
the Indians only those lands they used for European-style agriculture and 
occupation. 
The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greatest part 
of the country, upon a questionable foundation. Their cultivated fields, their 
constructed habitats, a space of ample sufficiency for their sustenance, and 
whatever they have annexed to themselves by personal labor, was undoubt-
edly by the Laws of nature theirs. But what is the right of the huntsman[?] ... 
Shall the lordly savage, not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of civi-
lization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a world? Shall he for-
bid the wilderness to blossom like the rose? Shall he forbid the oaks of the 
forest to fall before the ax of industry and rise again transformed into the 
habitations of ease and elegance? 
James Monroe, as president, more than once voiced the same theme. "[T]he 
hunter or savage state requires a greater extent of territory to sustain it, than 
is compatible with the progress and just claims of civilized life, and must 
yield to it ... " "[T]he earth was given to mankind to support the greatest 
number of which it is capable, and no tribe or people have a right to with-
hold from the wants of others more than is necessary for their own sup-
port and comfort." As the end of the expropriation process approached, 
Theodore Roosevelt made the argument with characteristic bluntness: "the 
settler and pioneer have at bottom had justice on their side; this great con-
tinent could not have been kept as nothing but a game preserve for squalid 
savages."8 
Common settlers agreed with these sentiments and invoked egalitarian, 
leveling arguments to explain why the land-rich Indians should be com-
pelled to share the wealth. Squatters on Chickasaw land successfully pro-
tested eviction that would "bring many women and children to a state of 
starvation merely to gratify a heathan nation Who have no better right to 
this land than we have ourselves; and they have by estemation nearly 
100,000 acres of land to each man Of their nation ... "9 
A funny thing happened on the way to acquiring Indian lands. In spite 
of these oft-repeated justifications for simply taking it, colonists very ear-
8. John Quincy Adams, "Oration of the Anniversary Festival of the Pilgrims (1802)," 
quoted in Charles C. Royce, Indian Land Cessions in the United States (Eighteenth Annual 
Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1896-97, part 2), 527, 536; Francis Paul 
Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse 
Acts, 1790-1834 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 227 (citing a letter from 
President Monroe to Andrew Jackson, Oct. 5, 1817); A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (James D. Richardson ed., New York 1896), 2: 16; 
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West (New York: G. Putnam and Sons, 1889), I :90. 
9. Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States (Washington: 
GPO, 1939), 6:106-13. 
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ly on began purchasing tracts. This soon became official policy. The Mas-
sachusetts Bay Company instructed its colonists in 1629 that "[i]f any of 
the Savages pretend Right of Inheritance to all or any Part of the land in 
our Patent ... purchase their claim in order to avoid the least Scruple of 
Intrusion." When the Crown began to exercise more direct oversight of the 
colonies in the 1660s, it reiterated this principle. "No colony hath any right 
to dispose of any lands conquered from the natives, unless both the cause 
of the conquest be just and the land lye within the bound which the king 
by his charter hath given it ... the country is [the natives] till they give it 
or sell it, though it not be improved." This was not mere rhetoric; Massa-
chusetts towns that had occupied lands without buying th1~m responded by 
retroactively making payments to the local tribes. 
The passage does note the one instance in which outright expropriation 
was permissible: "just" war, that is, defensive wars. "While the English 
generally recognized the validity of aboriginal ownership and felt the ne-
cessity to pay for the Indians' lands, no such necessity existed for lands 
acquired by conquest in a just war. Two wars, the Pequot War (1637) and 
King Philip's War (1675-1677) resulted in large transfers of realty by con-
quest." Conquest in New England, however, remained very much the ex-
ception, and the bottom line is that "contrary to the common belief that the 
Indians were ruthlessly deprived of their land, almost every part of [Mas-
sachusetts] that came to be inhabited by the whites was purchased from 
the Indians, except the areas that were either acquired by conquest or, like 
Salem and Boston, never claimed by Indians, because of depopulation by 
epidemics." 10 
The pattern of European land acquisition in New England, purchases 
punctuated by rare conquests, repeated itself across the rest of the conti-
nent. The United States paid over $800 million for Indian lands. Accord-
ing to Congress, the United States exercised the right of conquest only once 
and then half-heartedly. 11 
10. Joel N. Eno, The Puritans and Indian Lands (New York: 1906), 1, cited by Yasuhide 
Kawashima, Puritan Justice and the Indians: White Mans Law in Massachusetts (Middle-
town: Wesleyan University Press, 1986), 47-48,50, 51; William H. Whitmore, ed., The 
Colonial Laws of Mass. Reprinted from the Edition of 1660, with the Supplements to 1672 
(Boston: City Council of Boston, 1889), 160-61; James Warren Springer, "American Indi-
ans and the Law of Real Property in Colonial New England," American Journal of Legal 
History 30 (1986): 49. 
II. Felix S. Cohen, "Original Indian Title," Minnesota Law Review 32 (1947): 28, 37 n.20, 
46. Citing the Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs for 1872, Cohen maintains that 
"[e]xcept only in the case of the Indians in Minnesota, after the outbreak of 1862, the Unit-
ed States government has never extinguished an Indian title as by right of conquest; and in 
this latter case the Government provided the Indians another reservation, besides giving them 
the proceeds of the sales of the lands vacated by them in Minnesota." 
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Although Europeans recognized some Indian interest in land, they nev-
er "granted" the tribes all the sticks in the common-law bundle of proper-
ty rights; in particular, colonists consistently narrowed or entirely denied 
the Indians' power to sell land. Two facets of European doctrine are par-
ticularly relevant for Johnson v. M'lntosh: the ability of European govern-
ments to sell lands before they had purchased them from the Indians and 
the exclusive right of the British and American governments to purchase 
when a tribe was ready to sell. 
British sovereigns and American officials asserted the right to sell Indi-
an land to their citizens before any dealings with the occupying tribe. Pur-
chasers took "subject only to the Indian right of occupancy,"12 but other-
wise had a full fee interest. Combined with the exclusive right to purchase 
Indian lands (or conquer the tribe), discussed in the following section, this 
created a novel and peculiar "bifurcated title." Ultimate title resided with 
the European sovereign or its grantee; the Indian occupants retained "In-
dian title" until they sold (or were otherwise relieved of their lands). 
Colonizers always jealously maintained the superiority of their title. The 
London Company warned its agents to make "no admission, either direct 
or by inference, that the Indians possessed a superior claim on the land. 
When such an implication was made ... the company reacted with bitter 
resentment." 13 British and American law never questioned the basic premise 
that, whatever rights Indian title encompassed, such rights were ultimate-
ly subordinate to the separate title derived from the Crown, colony, state, 
or the United States. 
For example, if Indian title was equal to European title, adverse posses-
sion would have posed a serious problem to bifurcated title. A tribe could 
argue that if the sovereign did not extinguish their Indian title within the 
limitations period for trespass, and they continued to occupy the land, they 
had adverse possession against any grantee of the British or American 
governments. The next logical step in the argument would be that the In-
dians could also adversely possess against the sovereign itself. 
The colonists never recognized Indian title as creating such a power. In 
Klock v. Hudson, both (American) claimants rooted their title in a grant 
from the colony of New York in 1731. The defendant, however, established 
that Mohawk Indians occupied the disputed tract at the time of a deed in 
the plaintiff's chain of title, from 1761 onward, and hence, "under the 
doctrine of the common law rendering void the sale of lands, while they 
are in adverse possession," the plaintiff's chain of title had a gap. In re-
12. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 514. 
13. W. Stitt Robinson, Mother Earth: Land Grants in Virginia, 1607-1699 (Richmond: 
Virginia 350th Anniversary Corp., 1957), 3. 
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jecting this adverse possession claim, the court pointedly noted, as dis-
cussed above, that this same theory implied that the Indians could adversely 
possess against New York itself. 
[I]t must be apparent, that if the possession of the Indians was sufficient to 
destroy the operation of the deeds in I 761, it would be equally effectual to 
destroy the grant from government in 1731. Such a suggestion, however, is 
inadmissible. The policy, or the abstract right of granting lands in the posses-
sion of the native Indians, without their previous consent, as original lords of 
the soil, is a political question with which we have at present nothing to do. 14 
Another dilemma might arise with bifurcated title if the Indians sold to 
Y while the Crown or the United States sold to X. This was the basic fact 
pattern of M'lntosh. Given the superiority that colonizers assigned to their 
title, it comes as no surprise that X has title as against Y. The colonies, the 
British government, the states, and the United States achieved this result 
by the same rule: they barred anyone but themselves from purchasing lands 
from the Indians. Although most of the property rules discussed thus far 
involve European-Indian relations, this stricture was a regulation made by 
colonists, directed only at colonists. 15 
The universal and repeated enactment of laws barring purchases of land 
by private citizens from the Indians attests to the importance Britain, its 
colonies, and later the United States attached to this rule. In colonial New 
England, "[i]t is a reasonable generalization to say that land purchases from 
Indians were a governmental monopoly ... " Massachusetts apparently 
adopted the first such official law in 1634 and reenacted similar measures 
repeatedly. As late as 1760, Massachusetts publicized the law and empow-
ered local officials to enforce it at colonial expense. Almost every colony 
adopted such measures as soon as it began purchasing significant amounts 
of Indian land. 16 
As the British government increasingly took control over Indian affairs 
14. 3 Johnson's Reports 375, 384-85 (N.Y. 1808). 
15. As discussed above, the French apparently did not adopt such a rule and recognized 
private purchases of Indian lands. 
16. Springer, "Indians and the Law of Real Property," 35-39 (collecting cites). Rhode 
Island appears to be an exception to the otherwise universal colonial rule against private 
purchases from the natives. Based on the radical politics of the colony's founder, Roger 
Williams, and his relatively friendly posture toward the Indians, "in early Rhode Island the 
acquisition of the Indian title was thought to be paramount, and merely perfunctory approval 
of the purchase was made by the legislature." Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Com-
panies: Their Influence on Corporate Development ( 1939; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 
1968), 21 (footnote omitted). For additional history on the inalienability of aboriginal land 
title in the British Colonies, see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 221-41. 
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in the mid-1700s, it reiterated the long line of colonial precedents; for in-
stance, in 1753, the British government instructed the governor of New York 
"to forbid purchases of land by private individuals." The process of cen-
tralizing Indian policy culminated in the Proclamation of 1763. Inter alia, 
the Proclamation dictated that "no private Person do presume to make any 
Purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians ... 
if at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the 
said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our name [in pub-
lic, by colonial officials]." This royal proclamation superseded all similar 
colonial statutes and provided a uniform and universal ban on land purchas-
es from the Indians until the Revolutionary War. 
The Continental Congress, despite the unclear division of state and fed-
eral powers under the Articles of Confederation, soon enacted measures 
echoing the prohibition in the Proclamation of 1763. The subsequent Con-
stitution of 1789 unequivocally gave the national Congress exclusive power 
to conduct Indian affairs. Beginning in 1790, under a series of "Trade and 
Intercourse" acts, Congress continued to ban private land purchases from 
the Indians; later versions explicitly made private purchases a misdemeanor, 
punishable by jail terms of up to a year and fines of up to $1000.17 
Even though the United States generally respected French and Spanish 
property law in lands it purchased (or conquered) from those nations, such 
was the strength of the Anglo-American rule against private purchases from 
the Indians that this deference apparently did not extend to cases where 
these other sovereigns permitted such transactions. In several cases, Unit-
ed States commissioners adjudicating French claims in present-day Indi-
ana "refused a tract for the time being because it was obtained by a pri-
vate person from the Indian tribes in the neighborhood." Many of the laws 
barring private land dealings with the Indians forbade not only outright pur-
chases, but leases and even timber sales. 
Chief Justice Marshall conceded that rare exceptions existed to the laws 
refusing to recognize grants from Indians. "In New-England alone, some 
lands have been held under Indian deeds. But this was an anomaly arising 
from peculiar local and political causes." The sovereign could always give 
17. Robert N. Clinton, "The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of 
Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs," Boston University Law Re-
view 69 (1989): 329,349. For the complete text of the Proclamation of 1763, see Wilcomb 
E. Washburn, The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History (New 
York: Random House, 1973), 3:2135, or Clinton, "Proclamation of 1763," 328 (Appendix); 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 24:264, 319-20; 25:602; I Stat. 138 (1790); I Stat. 
330 (1793); I Stat. 472 ( 1796); I Stat. 746 ( 1799). Congress worded these later statutes quite 
broadly, criminalizing the act of negotiating ("treating") with the Indians for land "directly 
or indirectly." 
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its blessings to unapproved land purchases after the fact, and according to 
a recent book this practice was common in colonial Massachusetts. 18 
Later on, however, the United States rarely granted such ex post facto 
approval of land purchases from the Indians. The government did recog-
nize the acquisition of Grosse Ile, near Detroit, by the Macomb brothers. 
The last such dispensation apparently occurred in 1807. Much more com-
mon, even before 1807, was the treatment received by war hero George 
Rogers Clark. Congress refused to recognize a 1779 gram the Piankashaw 
tribe made to Clark, in the wake of his remarkable conquest of Illinois 
during the Revolutionary War. Even the extraordinarily sympathetic attempt 
by the Chippewa, Ottawa, Wyandot, and Pottawatamie Indians in an 1807 
treaty to reserve three square miles for one Dr. William Brown, who had 
ministered to them for ten years, failed to move Congress. The committee 
processing the petition first voiced its irritation with such requests, stating 
that it was "almost unnecessary for the committee to state to the house, that 
many applications have been made to Congress for the confirmation of ti-
tles to land purchased by individuals from the Indian tribes ... " Had the 
committee been sympathetic, it could have ruled for Dr. Brown on the 
ground that rather than selling land directly to him, the tribes instead had 
negotiated a grant to Brown under the aegis of a treaty with the United 
States. Applying substance over form, and voicing fear of a slippery slope 
of private purchases disguised as reservations in treaties, the committee 
recommended rejection of the petition. 
In the present case no direct sale or transfer is pretended; but the committee 
can discover, neither in the manner, nor the object, any thing to materially 
distinguish it from former applications; or that would induce a relaxation of 
a general rule. Therefore, Resolved, that the prayer of the petitioners ought 
not to be granted. 
Congress' refusal to recognize grants to a philanthropic doctor and a war 
hero of Clark's stature shows the importance attached to the long-stand-
ing rule against private acquisitions of land from the tribes. 19 
18. American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the 
United States, Public Lands (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), I :9; Nathaniel Shurt-
leff, ed., Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 
(Boston: W. White, 1853), 4:282 (statute of 1665 barring leases); Livermore, Early Ameri-
can Land Companies, 198-203 (administrators refuse to recognize 999--year lease given by 
Seneca tribe to the New York-Genesee Land Company); Springer, "Indians and the Law of 
Real Property," 36 (barring timber sales); The Seneca Lands, Opinions of the United States 
Attorney General (1819), 1:465 (same); Johnson v. M'lntosh, 570, citing James Sullivan, 
The History of Land Titles in Massachusetts (1801; reprint, Buffalo: W. S. Hein, 1972), 45; 
Kawashima, Puritan Justice, 54 (sovereign approving purchase from Indians after the fact). 
19. John R. Command, "The Story of Grosse lie," Michigan Historical Magazine 3 ( 1919): 
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There are two reasons that I have traced the history of this longstanding 
rule in such detail. First, its long and unbroken pedigree makes the hold-
ing of M'Intosh (reaffirming the rule disallowing private purchases from 
the Indians) seem predictable and, moreover, lays the foundation for the 
novel argument that custom forms the central ground for Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion. Second, the rule makes perfect sense as a tool for 
efficient expropriation of Indian lands. Hence its universal enactment and 
strict enforcement support the thesis of least-cost expropriation presented 
below in Part 3. 
In the context of the facts of M 'Intosh, the omnipresence of the rule poses 
a puzzle: why did the predecessors in interest to the plaintiffs in M 'Intosh, 
experienced and worldly businessmen as demonstrated below, spend a 
considerable sum to buy a seemingly worthless title directly from the In-
dian tribes in southern Illinois and Indiana? 
The plaintiffs' predecessors were not alone in speculating that British 
or American governments might recognize some Indian deeds. George 
Washington, undoubtedly a sophisticated observer of politics and an astute 
land speculator, confided to a close friend his view of the Proclamation of 
1763's ban on purchases from the tribes: 
I can never look upon that proclamation in any other light (but this I say be-
tween ourselves) than as a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the In-
dians ... Any person, therefore, who neglects the present opportunity of 
hunting out good lands, and in some measure marking and distinguishing 
them, for his own, in order to keep others from settling them, will never re-
gain it. 
Washington felt, correctly, that all Indian lands would soon fall into colo-
nists' hands, and if purchase from the Indians no longer established title 
to good lands, then he planned to pursue other means to the same end. 
George Croghan, a prominent trader, land speculator, and British Indian 
agent, continued to buy land directly from the tribes even after colonial 
officials nullified earlier purchases he had made. 
Croghan and many other "gentlemen of fortune" felt emboldened to 
make such private purchases from the Indians in part because of the Cam-
130. One George Ash, in 1807, was the recipient of "the last Indian grant to receive any 
favorable treatment from Congress." Ash, originally abducted by the Indians, had become 
very friendly with his captors and the tribes eventually released him. Congress gyrated on 
the petition for five years, eventually approving a 640-acre Indian grant. Payson Jackson 
Treat, The National Land System, 1785-1820 (New York: E. B. Treat, 1910), 296-97; Amer-
ican State Papers, Public Lands, 2: II (Application to Confirm an Indian Grant, Communi-
cated to the House of Representatives, January 20, 1810). 
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den-Yorke Opinion, a peculiar legal opinion letter originally written by 
British Attorney General Charles Pratt (who later became Lord Camden) 
and Solicitor General Charles Yorke. This document affirmed the right of 
individuals to buy land from rajahs in British India. A slightly altered ver-
sion, not limited to India (it is not clear if the original authors, or others, 
made the alterations), found its way to America no later than 1773. 
Croghan was not alone in basing decisions to invest significant sums, in 
large part, on the seemingly shaky foundation of the Camden-Yorke Opin-
ion. The Illinois and Wabash land companies, whose purchases in 1773 and 
1775lie at the root of M'lntosh, were also motivated by the opinion. Patrick 
Henry "was convinced from every authority [including the Camden-Yorke 
Opinion] that the law knew, that a purchase from the natives was as full 
and ample a title as could be obtained."20 
Improvident belief that courts would agree with the Camden-Yorke 
Opinion and void all legislative and executive bars on private purchases of 
Indian lands may in part explain how land speculators in the 1770s hoped 
to succeed. But this hardly seems a sufficient basis for such experienced 
businessmen to take this risk. As the later actions of many of the specula-
tors indicate, they may have planned from the first to obtain legislative 
action after the fact to except them from the laws that would void their ti-
tles. The incredible size of their claims, often in the millions of acres, pro-
vided a ready source of consideration with which to bribe legislators. Fi-
nally, anticipation of political change may have motivated the marked 
increase in private purchases from the Indians in the 1770s. 
20. Letter from Washington to Crawford, in The Writings of Georgt· Washington (Wash-
ington, D.C.: GPO, 1931 ), 2:220; Albert T. Volwiler, George Croghan and the Western 
Movement, 174 i-i 782 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1926), 257, 296-97; Jack M. Sosin, "The 
Yorke-Camden Opinion and American Land Speculators," Pennsylvania Magazine of His-
tory and Biography 85 ( 1961 ): 38, 42-43; Clarence Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in Brit-
ish Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in imperialism Cul-
minating in the America Revolution (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1917), 2:201. There appear 
to have been at least two similar documents supporting private purchases of Indian lands. 
Samuel Wharton, the Philadelphia Indian trader and western land speculator, "wrote that he 
had secured a very full and satisfactory opinion from Sarjeant Glynn, 'the best Lawyer, Lord 
Camden assures me, in England,' upon the title of the Indian grant of I 768." George Elmer 
Lewis, The indiana Company, i763-98 (Glendale, Cal.: Arthur H. Clark, 1941), 159. The 
United Illinois and Wabash Companies cited Glynn's opinion in their last memorial to Con-
gress. United Companies, Memorial of i8i6, 46-47 (Early American Imprints, 2d series, 
no. 39,145). The United Companies also reproduced an opinion by Henry Dagge, Esq., on 
the validity of private purchases of Indian lands. Ibid., 45-46. Benjamin Franklin and Patrick 
Henry wrote short endorsements of both opinions. Ibid. 47. According to the United Com-
panies, both opinions and the endorsements were authored in I 775. 
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B. The Land Companies and Their Purchases 
The specific background of Johnson v. M'Intosh begins with land purchases 
from tribes in southern Illinois and Indiana by two closely related entities: 
the Illinois Land Company and the Wabash Land Company. The two later 
merged into the United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies. 
The Illinois Company arose out of the Indian trading and troop provi-
sioning activities of a group of prominent Philadelphia merchants led by 
David Franks and the Gratz brothers, Bernard and Michael. These mer-
chants had very limited business success in the later 1760s and early 1770s. 
When their partner and agent in Illinois, William Murray, caught wind of 
the Camden-Yorke Opinion in 1773, he elatedly wrote the Gratzes of his 
plans for turning their activities towards land speculation. "So courage, my 
boys. I hope we shall yet be satisfied for past vexations attending our con-
cern in Illinois."2I 
Murray reached Kaskaskia, a town with a British fort on the Mississip-
pi in southern Illinois, in June 1773. He promptly "showed the [Camden-
Yorke Opinion] to Captain Lord, commander at Kaskaskia. Lord, howev-
er, was not overawed by the weighty names and informed Murray that he 
'should not suffer him to settle any of the lands as it was expressly con-
trary to his Majestys Orders."' Despite this admonition, Murray promptly 
began negotiations with the Illinois tribes. He conducted his negotiations 
at the fort and claims to have been scrupulously honest. "[T]o avoid any 
insidious suggestion of malignant persons, I prevented the Indians from 
getting a drop of spirituous liquor during the whole of the negotiation." 
He negotiated slowly, over more than a month, in order to make sure 
that all tribes with claims agreed to terms. This was important since land 
rights among the tribes were unclear. Boundaries separating the Illinois 
21. Anna Edith Marks, "William Murray, Trader and Land Speculator in the Illinois Coun-
try," Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society 26 (1919): 190. Marks's article 
contains the most reliable account of William Murray and the thin record of his activities in 
Illinois. A more recent biography of Murray is not reliable. See Martin Ridge, Book Re-
view, Illinois History Journal 82 (1989): 275 (reviewing Myles N. Murray and Robert V. 
Zoda, William Murray, Esq.: Land Agent in the Illinois Territory Before the Revolutionary 
War (Brooklyn: T. Gaus, 1987) ("Dubious premises, unsubstantiated assertions, and a lack 
of hard facts plague the authors" in their "shabby and misguided effort to make a Revolu-
tionary hero of a failed intriguer .. . "). For similar appraisals, see John D. W. Guice, Book 
Reviews, Journal of Mississippi History 51 (1989): 265; Dwight F. Henderson, Book Re-
views, Journal of the Early Republic 9 (1989): 558. The Illinois Company involved in the 
Johnson v. M'Intosh case must be distinguished from an earlier (1766) abortive venture of 
the same name. See Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, 1:94-101, 316-24; 
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Empires, Indians and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 308 n.77. 
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and other Great Lakes tribes were not well-defined and seemed to shift 
continuously. 22 
Murray dealt with the remnants of the once great Illinois tribes. Their 
population had dropped from around 12,000 in 1680 to 1,720 in 1756, to 
500 in 1800, as they fell victim to European diseases and Indian enemies 
on all sides. Unable to prevent neighboring tribes from encroaching on their 
extensive land, the Kaskaskia, Peoria, and Cahokia tribes on July 5, 1773, 
deeded to Murray and the other twenty-one members of the Illinois Com-
pany two large tracts of land in southern and central Illinois.23 
In return for the two tracts, the Illinois Company paid the tribes with a 
wide variety of goods, including inter alia 250 strouds (sheets of coarse 
woolen cloth), 250 blankets, 500 pounds of gunpowder, 400 pounds of lead, 
2000 gun flints, 10,000 pounds of flour, 2 horses, and 12 homed cattle. The 
company originally valued these goods at over $37,000, but in the stipu-
lated facts of M'lntosh its successors placed the value at only $24,000.24 
The otherwise unremarkable deed contains a feature apparently over-
looked by earlier scholars: an alternative conveyance to the King, in use 
(trust) for the grantees. After naming the members of the Illinois Compa-
ny as grantees directly, the deed in the alternative grants the two tracts "unto 
his most sacred majesty, George the Third, ... for the use, benefit, and 
behoof of all the said several abovenamed grantees."25 Although never 
raised by congressional committees rejecting the company's claim, or by 
Chief Justice Marshall in the M'lntosh opinion that foreclosed the claim 
once and for all, this is strong evidence that even at the time of the pur-
chase the grantees had profound doubts about their ability to buy legal ti-
tle directly from the Indians. Utilizing a lawyerly "belts and suspenders" 
22. Clarence W. Alvord, The Illinois Country, 1673-1818, vol. I of The Centennial His-
tory of Illinois (1920; reprint, Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965), 30 I, citing letter of 
Lord to Haldimand, July 3, 1773 (British Museum); United Companies, 1796 Memorial, 
i-ii (Murray's abstract of transaction); White, The Middle Ground, 17, 19. 
23. Emily J. Blasingham, "The Illinois Indians, 1634-1800: A Study in Depopulation" 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1956), summarized in Ethnohistory 3 ( 1956): 193-224, 
361-412; William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger, eds., Handbook of North American 
indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 15:594-97, 674, 678-79. Less 
than one hundred years earlier, the Illinois Confederation consisted of as many as twelve 
distinct tribes, but the severe population decline led to a series of mergers and extinctions 
that left only these three. The map above (68) shows the location of the Illinois Company's 
purchases. Murray promptly recorded the deed at the Kaskaskia records office. United Com-
panies, 1796 Memorial, i-ii, 11-12. 
24. United Companies, 1796 Memorial, 5 (quoting deed), 49; Johnson v. M'lntosh, 553. 
25. United Companies, 1796 Memorial, 6. This alternative grant is reiterated in the ha-
bendum clause of the deed: "to HAVE and to HOLD [to the grantees individually] or unto 
his said Majesty .. . to and for the use, benefit, and behoof of the said grantees ... " Ibid. 
9. 
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approach, Murray, the presumptive scrivener, tried to paint himself and his 
associates as beneficiaries of land formally held in the name of the King. 
Murray's caution proved well-advised, for the Illinois Company purchase 
"evoked a sharp response in London ... [British officials aimed to] pre-
vent the speculators from establishing any settlement in consequence of 
'those pretended Titles' and to authorize the local commander in the Illi-
nois country to declare the 'King's disallowance of such unwarrantable 
proceedings."' They instructed the commander at Kaskaskia "to delete from 
the public notary's register any of the proceedings relating to purchases 
already made and to declare publicly that they were invalid."26 
About eighteen months after the purchase, in January 1774, the British 
commander at Kaskaskia made just such a public pronouncement, telling 
the Illinois Indians that they could still consider themselves holders of the 
land. According to Murray, the commander told him that the tribal leaders 
rejected this seemingly magnanimous offer. 
After some deliberation, the Chiefs replied, "That they thought; what the great 
Captain said was not right; that they had sold the lands to me [Murray] and 
my friends not for a short time, but, as long as the Sun rose and set;-That I 
had paid them what they had agreed for, and to their satisfaction, and more 
than they had asked for; and that they wished how soon I and my friends 
should come and settle upon the lands; that they would help to protect us 
against our enemies, and hoped we would do the same for them &c.27 
Murray and his Philadelphia partners perhaps took some heart from this 
faithfulness on the part of their vendors, but they continued to worry about 
obtaining official recognition for the Illinois Company's deed. Unable to 
find political support in their own state for their purchase, the Pennsylva-
nians of the Illinois Company turned to Lord Dunmore, Governor of Vir-
ginia. Absent direct royal administration, Virginia claimed, and was rec-
ognized to have, jurisdiction over Illinois by virtue of its colonial charter. 
Murray visited Dunmore in April 1774. An aspiring land speculator him-
self, the governor apparently agreed to throw his weight behind the Illi-
nois Company's claim in return for the chance to participate in subsequent 
transactions. Murray was already talking of a second scheme by May. 
To satisfy the desires of the governor, Murray created the Wabash Land Com-
pany, of which Lord Dunmore and several men from Maryland, Philadelphia, 
and London became members ... His reward promised, Lord Dunmore wrote 
to Lord Dartmouth [British Secretary of State] a most cordial recommenda-
26. Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial 
Policy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 233; Marks, "William Murray," 203 
n.92 (order dated March 9, 1774). 
27. United Companies, 1796 Memorial, ii-iii (Murray's abstract of transaction). 
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tion of the Illinois Land Company ... In a later letter Dunmore denied that 
he had any connection with the Illinois Land Company, but he kept discreet-
ly silent about the Wabash Land Company.28 
Instead of negotiating a second purchase himself, Murray recruited a 
prominent local Frenchman, Louis Viviat, as a partner and agent.29 One 
historian has suggested that Murray employed a Frenchman for this sec-
ond purchase in order to invoke the tradition of private purchases by that 
nation's citizens and to ensure their political support for the Company's 
title. Murray may have believed that a decision against Viviat's Indian deed 
would be seen as a threat to all French titles in the west, an impression the 
British wanted to avoid. 
Viviat treated with Piankashaw tribal leaders at Vincennes (Post St. Vin-
cent) and Vermillion in present-day Indiana. The Piankashaw were one of 
six tribes cJassified as Miami Indians. Like the Illinois tlibes, the Miami 
as a group suffered precipitous population declines after contact with Eu-
ropeans; their numbers fell from 7,500 in 1682 to just ovt:r 2,000 in 1736. 
Although they were closely related to the Illinois tribes in culture and per-
haps heritage, the two groups had long-standing animosity for each other. 
Viviat reached terms and executed a deed, on behalf of the twenty mem-
bers of the Wabash Company, with the Piankashaw representatives on 
October 18, 1775. Like the Illinois Company deed, it conveyed two large 
tracts, both along the Wabash River. The first (northern) tract straddled the 
Wabash between the Cat River and Point Coupee; the second (southern) 
tract ran from the Ohio up to the White River. The Piankashaws specifi-
cally reserved the land between the two tracts, and in a further· term im-
plying their sovereignty the tribes granted the Wabash Company a naviga-
tion easement on those portions of the Wabash River and its tributaries 
situated outside the purchased lands. The Wabash Company paid the Pi-
ankashaws with trade goods similar to those given by the Illinois Compa-
ny, but with a slightly higher value: the Company originally claimed the 
28. Marks, "William Murray," 202; Alvord, Illinois Country, 302-3 and n.35. 
29. Viviat was "a prominent Frenchman of Kaskaskia." Clarence Edwin Carter, Great 
Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774 (1910; reprint, Port Washington, N.Y. : Kenni-
kat Press, 1970), 69. He was apparently a far-ranging trader; business took him as far east 
as Pittsburgh. Clarence Walworth Alvord and Clarence Edwin Carter, eds., Trade and Poli-
tics, 1767-1769, vol. 26 of the Collections of the Illinois State Historical Society, British 
Series 3 (Springfield, Ill.: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Society, 1921), 142. He 
served as a judge under the British regime in Illinois and remained loyal to the British dur-
ing the Revolution. See Alvord and Carter, Trade and Politics, 462-67, and Alvord, Illinois 
Country, 320. This led to a break with Murray, who was a revolutionary and "devoted both 
time and money to the cause of the revolting colonies ... " See Alvord, Illinois Country, 
321-22. 
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items were worth $42,477.73, but its successors stipulated to the figure of 
$31,000 in the litigation of M 'Intosh. 30 
Unlike Murray, Viviat apparently failed to include all the tribes with 
colorable claims to the lands purchased. In particular the Weas may have 
had claims in the southern tract. In addition, there is evidence that the Pi-
ankashaw negotiators did not have the support of their own tribe in mak-
ing the grant. These facts are at odds with the case stated in M 'Intosh, which 
represented both purchases as being made from united, consenting tribes 
with exclusive Indian title. 
Like the Illinois Company deed, Viviat included an alternative grant to 
the King, in use (trust) for the grantee members of the Company. This again 
shows that the members of the Company had sincere doubts about the 
validity of direct private purchases from the Indians_31 
C. Losing the First Round 
In order to cure any defect in their title, the Illinois and Wabash compa-
nies did what so many other land speculators did in the early republic: they 
lobbied the legislature. Lobbying was no prettier then than today. For leg-
islators, land claims formed "the most complicated and embarrassing Sub-
ject ... Infinite pains are taken by a certain sett of men vulgarly called 
Landd robbers [jobbers], or Land-Sharks to have it in their power to en-
gross the best lands ... "32 
In the early years of the American Revolution, the companies took two 
important steps to obtain legislative confirmation of their titles. First, they 
attracted influential, well-connected investors to bolster their lobbying ef-
forts, and second, they merged into the United Illinois and Wabash Land 
Company (the "United Companies") to pool their resources and coordinate 
their efforts. 
James Wilson, later one of the primary architects of the Constitution and 
a Supreme Court Justice, was, by 1779, the central figure in the United Com-
30. Marks, "William Murray," 204; Sturtevant and Trigger, Handbook of North American 
Indians, 15:596-97,681,688. Population figures for the Piankashaw tribe alone are appar-
ently unavailable; United Companies, 1796 Memorial, 17, 21-22, 49; Johnson v. M' Intosh, 
557. The map above (68) shows the location of the Wabash Company's purchases. Wabash 
Company investors included Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore and Maryland Governor 
Thomas Johnson-predecessor in interest to the Johnson v. M'lntosh plaintiffs, Joshua 
Johnson (his grandson) and Thomas Graham (son-in-Jaw). 
31. United Companies,J796 Memorial, 19 (granting clause), 23 (habendum clause), 23-
24 (mentioning only Piankashaw chiefs as signatories to deed); White, The Middle Ground, 
372. 
32. Paul Wallace Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington D.C.: 
GPO, 1968), 64, quoting statement of Rep. David Howell, Rhode Island. 
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pany's efforts. Robert Morris, financier of the American Revolution, was 
another prominent investor, as was Dr. Thomas Walker, "a dominant figure 
among Virginia's land speculators in the later 1700s." The Companies also 
tried to lure American military leaders to their cause, including General 
Arthur St. Clair and Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, though there is no 
evidence that either became a shareholder in the United Companies.33 
The members of the Illinois Company and the Wabash Company merged 
on March 13, 1779. Wilson became chairman on August 20, 1779. He, 
along with Murray, drafted the Articles of Union and the Constitution, 
which the members adopted on April 29, 1780. The preamble to the Arti-
cles stated that "the lands should be in common between [the two compa-
nies' members]." Apparently the shareholders believed that the Wabash 
Company lands were slightly more valuable, since two of the eighty-four 
authorized shares were "conceded to the Ouabache [Wabash] Company 
upon uniting their interest with the Illinois Company."34 
Murray had begun lobbying even before the companies united. While 
the British government had clearly rejected the claims, the happenstance 
of the American Revolution opened up a new possibility for vindicating 
the titles: the (newly sovereign) state of Virginia, whose colonial charter 
encompassed Illinois along with the rest of the Old Northwest (basically 
those lands north of the Ohio River and East of the Mississippi). Thus 
Murray presented a memorial to the Virginia legislature in December 1778 
outlining the Companies' land claims. There was precedent for relief from 
this quarter: Richard Henderson, organizer of the Transylvania Company, 
twice received grants of other lands when the Virginia General Assembly 
rejected his purchases from the Indians. 
Virginia, however, refused to recognize the Companies' Indian deeds. 
Indeed, the activities of the Illinois and Wabash companies led the state's 
33. Wilson was an inveterate land speculator, investing in at least two other large schemes: 
the (in)famous Yazoo lands and the Indiana Company. C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo-Law and 
Politics in the New Republic: The Case of Fletcher v. Peck (Providence: Brown University 
Press, 1966), 5; Aaron M. Sakolski, The Great American Land Bubble (New York: Harper 
and Bros., 1932), 135; Lewis, The Indiana Company, 253. Morris bought a share of The 
United Company on October 2, 1779. Minutes of the United Illinois and Wabash Land 
Companies 46 (manuscript in collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila-
delphia) [hereafter Minutes of the United Companies]. Thomas Perkins Abernethy, West em 
Lands and the American Revolution (New York: D. Appleton, 1937), 60, discusses some of 
Dr. Walker's speculation. The members of the United Companies propm;ed granting Gener-
als St. Clair, Thompson, and Parsons tracts of up to 24,000 acres and discussed extending 
the same terms to Brigadier General Wayne. Apparently contemplating the formation of a 
broader base of support for their claims, the shareholders also considered smaller grants to 
soldiers of lower rank. Minutes of the United Companies, 50, 53-58, 61. 
34. Minutes of the United Companies, 19, 62-67; United Companies, 1796 Memorial, ix, 
7-13; United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies, 1803 Memorial to Congress (Early 
American Imprints, 2d series, no. 5193, 9-14). 
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legislature, in May 1779, to restate the ancient rule against direct purchas-
es from the Indians. And the reason given could not have come as a sur-
prise. "It was stated that no person had ever had the right to purchase lands 
within the limits of Virginia from the natives, except those persons autho-
rized to make such purchases for the use and benefit of the colony and later 
the state."35 
The fluid political situation, however, soon gave the United Companies 
yet another body to lobby: the new national legislature. In response to pres-
sure from states without extensive claims to western lands under their co-
lonial charters, Virginia and other states ceded their western territory to the 
nation in 1783. Initially, in 1781, Virginia tried to condition the cession of 
this land on the Continental Congress' refusing to recognize the claims of 
the land companies. Although the final deed of cession contained no such 
explicit term, there was a tacit understanding that the national legislature 
would reject the claims.36 
Between 1781 and 1796 Wilson drafted no less than five memorials to 
the national legislature pleading the United Companies' case. Complete 
copies survive of only the extraordinary efforts made in 1796-97, when the 
Companies publicly printed a fifty-five-page pamphlet and submitted a 
thirty-page memorial to Congress. Wilson, along with Morris and some-
times others, received expenses and stipends for trips to present these 
memorials to Congress and, presumably, to lobby legislators. The Com-
panies apparently also engaged in propaganda as part of their lobbying 
efforts. Murray purchased two hundred copies of Samuel Wharton's Plain 
Facts, a diatribe invoking universal natural rights-Indians' rights to sell 
their land and settlers' rights to buy it-to justify private purchases from 
the tribes.37 
To buttress these efforts, the Companies continually scavenged for evi-
35. William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts, 
1652-1781 (1875), 1:314 (Dec. 26, 1778); Livermore, Early American Land Companies, 
95-96; Alvord, Illinois Country, 341, citing William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large 
of Virginia (1809), 10:97; Lewis, The Indian Company, 220. Virginia's 1779 statute barring 
private land purchases from the Indians replaced a similar provision that appears to have 
lapsed prior to the United Companies purchases; the legal implications of this lapsed stat-
ute in the Johnson v. M'lntosh case are discussed below. 
36. Thomas Donaldson, The Public Domain (Washington: GPO, 1884; reprint, New York: 
Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970), 67-70; Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An 
Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1778 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), 225-26; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Rayneval (March 20, 1801), in PaulL. Ford, ed., Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: 
G. P. Putnam, 1892-1899), 8:19-21. 
37. Minutes of the United Companies, 82-84 (1781, 1782), 98 (1787), I OJ (1790), I 05 
(1796), 107-108 (Aprill2, 1799) (empowering Wilson and Morris "to prosecute the busi-
ness of this Company" with Congress). The company granted Wilson an extra share for 
drafting the first memorial; no payment is recorded for the later ones. 
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dence supporting their claims. In 1787, they obtained an affidavit from one 
Bernard Tardiveau averring that during his travels in Illinois he had seen 
the Companies' deeds and that "the Inhabitants of that Country speak of 
the said Purchase as being made in the most publick manner." When a 
delegation of Indians from Illinois visited Philadelphia in early 1793, the 
Companies appointed one of their shareholders, Pollack, to ask about con-
ditions in the region and any knowledge the Indians had of the Companies' 
deeds. A smallpox epidemic among the visitors, along with strenuous ob-
jections of government officials to contacts by such a private citizen with 
Indian guests of the United States, made this job almost impossible. Pol-
lack did manage to speak with a chief named Petit Castor (Little Beaver) 
who, after touching his father's signature on a copy of the deed, said "he 
had often heard his father speak of it as a fair sale and that value had been 
received for the lands ... " 
The Companies kept close tabs on American land acquisitions that might 
overlap their claims. In 1793, they inquired about a treaty made with the 
tribes occupying the banks of the Wabash River, but Secretary of War Henry 
Knox noted that, since the Senate was still considering the Treaty, he could 
not disclose its contents. The Companies took pains to inform Knox that 
they had no intentions of violating federal law by settling lands not yet 
ceded by the tribes. 38 
The members' changing choices for financing their operations indicates 
increasing pessimism over the Companies' prospects. In 1778 and 1779 they 
repeatedly assessed themselves in order to raise funds, displaying confidence 
by declining to sell any interest in their claims to new investors. Thereaf-
ter, however, the members instead raised funds by selling shares, thus di-
luting their ownership. The Companies Articles created eighty-four shares, 
with thirty retained by the Companies. Robert Morris was one of the first 
purchasers, in 1789, and others bought all but three of the thirty company-
owned shares over the next year. When the Companies needed to raise $500 
in late 1792, five members offered only $100 for an additional share, and 
that only if the Companies could not find an outside purchaser. Somebody, 
however, found a mark: John Nicholson, Esq., a noted Pennsylvania land 
speculator, willing to part with $500 for the share.39 
38. Minutes of the United Company, 104 (Jan. 23, 1787), 116-19 (Feb. 6, 1793), 157-59 
(April 2, 1793, citing the first Trade and Intercourse Act, codifying ban on private purchas-
es of Indian land). 
39. The Companies assessed each shareholder $50 on Nov. 3, 1778; $100 on Nov. 7, 1778; 
$30 on March 24, 1779; and £5 (Pennsylvania currency) on September 24, 1781; ibid., 5, 
6, 20, 98; ibid., 28, 61 (number of shares authorized and issued); ibid., 112-13 (Dec. 1792) 
(sale of share to Nicholson). Interestingly, in a later ( 1793) transaction between two insid-
ers, Michael Gratz paid David Franks $500 Spanish Milled Dollars for a share. Gratz and 
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The members, even before beginning to lobby in earnest, contemplated 
dilution of their interest in another way: granting a large portion of their 
lands to the federal government in return for recognition of the Compa-
nies' title to the remainder. The members first discussed a gift to the Unit-
ed States in conjunction with a supposed patriotic desire to reward mem-
bers of the armed forces by making "a Cession to Congress at a moderate 
value, in trust for the United States of a Tract of Land sufficient to enable 
them to pay the stipulated bounties to Officers and Soldiers ... "40 
The Companies were always very careful about the legal formalities of 
such a grant. They consistently proposed to cede all their lands to the gov-
ernment, which would then grant a portion back to the Companies. Why 
did they propose this two-step transaction, when it would have been sim-
pler for the company to grant the government the proposed share of its lands 
in one step? The shareholders probably felt more secure with title rooted 
in a patent directly from the federal government. 
The Companies vacillated on the fraction of lands they proposed to re-
tain. They first discussed keeping a fifth of their acreage, expressed will-
ingness later to reduce that fraction to an eighth, but in their final major 
lobbying effort, in 1796, told Congress that they would compromise their 
claim if permitted to take title to a quarter of the land encompassed in their 
four tracts, leaving the details to later negotiation.41 
In trying to sell Congress on such a compromise, the United Companies 
repeatedly emphasized that, by relying on their deeds, the nation could 
avoid paying the Illinois and Piankashaw Indians a second time for the same 
lands. "[A] transfer of [the company's title] to the United States may be 
rendered effectual, to preclude the necessity of a second purchase, and to 
bar all future claims of the Indians to the lands in question ... " Just in 
case Congressmen missed the point, the Companies later made the point 
again, more stridently: 
Franks were business partners in other ventures, and it is possible that this was a sham trans-
action to try to prop up the publicly perceived value of shares. 
Land claims based on Indian deeds sold at deep discounts; as early as 1779, "[s]hares in 
the Indiana Company [discussed above, note 33] were advertised for sale and brought when 
sold at about twenty per cent of their estimated face value ... " Volwiler, George Croghan, 
314. Sales at 20 percent of face value correspond precisely to the ratio that United Compa-
nies insiders were willing to pay for the share Nicholson bought at full price. 
40. Minutes of the United Companies, 15. 
41. The members first discussed this approach at a meeting in late 1781 and proposed 
"cleansing" their title via a United States patent in all subsequent memorials. Ibid., 98. For 
subsequent offers, see United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies, Memorial of 1797, 5 
(Early American Imprints, 1st series, no. 32, 977); Minutes of the United Companies, 98 
(fall 1781) (one fifth, consisting of part of the first, or southern, Illinois Company tract); ibid., 
ll 0 (Dec. 17, 1791) (one eighth, no location specified). 
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We are persuaded that the government of the United States, would not reject 
a valid title, to the great injury of many of their good citizens; and, at a greater 
price, recur to the Indians for a new purchase, sinking in their pockets (viz. 
the Indians) the large sums that have been paid and expended by the first bona 
fide purchasers, who remain true and faithful citizens of the United States. 
Successive national legislatures never found a compromise attractive. 
From the very first memorial in I 781, they rejected the Companies' claims 
based on the ancient, omnipresent rules against private purchases of land 
from the Indians: "the said purchase had been made, without the license 
of the then government, or other public authority, contrary to the common 
and known usage, in such cases established." The Companies did win over 
one legislative committee in I 788, which reasoned that the nation could 
step into the Companies' shoes: "however improper it may be in general 
to countenance private purchases from Indians ... the United States will 
be ultimately benefitted by an exemption from the expense of purchasing 
the same Lands ... " 
This is as close as the United Illinois and Wabash Companies would ever 
get to success. In 1792 a Senate committee felt that the benefits of strictly 
enforcing the rule against private purchases of Indian lands outweighed the 
benefits of waiving the rule in this particular case. Thus it rejected the 
Companies' petition on the predictable grounds that "deeds obtained by 
private persons from the Indians, without any antecedent authority or sub-
sequent confirmation from the government, could not vest in the grant-
ees ... a title to the lands ... "42 
In their concerted lobbying effort of 1796-97, the Companies marshaled 
every possible argument in favor of recognizing Indian deeds. They cited 
a few exceptional cases in which colonies had recognized private purchases 
from Indians and quoted at length from the Camden-Yorke Opinion. They 
emphasized the independence of the tribes from whom th1~y purchased and 
the fact that these Indians had never sold any rights in land to a colony or 
the royal government. Summing up, they stated a rule flatly at odds with 
the weight of authority: "Mere sovereignty, without purchase from the 
native Indians was never considered, as conveying a title, or any Right of 
Soil." Congress was unmoved and adopted the Senate committee's 1792 
report rejecting the claims. The Companies had an insumtountable hurdle: 
42. Statement of December 1791, included in United Companies, 1796 Memorial, 29; 
ibid., 50-51; United Companies, 1797 Memorial, part I, 5, 6; ibid., Appendix II ("Additional 
Statements by the Agents of the Illinois and Wabash Land Companies"), 7 [emphasis in 
original]; ibid., Appendix I, 3; Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, I: 115-16 
(Report of Committee [on] The United Land Companies of the Illinois and Wabash, June 
27, 1788). 
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the long and virtually uninterrupted line of laws barring private purchases 
from the Indians.43 
Even as they lobbied Congress, the United Companies intimated that they 
might pursue a judicial remedy. Their 1797 memorial quoted at length from 
Van Horne s Lessee v. Dorrance on the constitutional limits on legislative 
power.44 The Companies emphasized that, in offering to compromise with 
Congress, they in no way admitted that a legislature could decide the va-
lidity of title-a quintessentially judicial issue. 
D. Interregnum 
The Companies' strenuous lobbying in 1796-97 may have been motivat-
ed by pecuniary pressures on some of its leading members due to a severe 
financial panic beginning in 1796. Wilson, hounded by creditors even as 
he traveled to sit on federal circuit courts, died a pauper in 1798. Robert 
Morris came out of debtors' prison in 1801 as "lean, low-spirited and as 
poor as a commission of bankruptcy can make a man whose effects will, 
it is said, not pay a shilling on the pound" and died penniless in 1806.45 
The next step certainly evidenced desperation. Only months after Congress 
rejected the Companies' claims, unspecified "Inhabitants" of Knox County, 
Indiana Territory (which included parts of present-day Illinois), presented a 
copy of the Wabash Company deed to the secretary of the Indiana Territory 
and asked that the government either confirm the grant or at least refrain from 
making any other grants in the specified regions. These "Inhabitants" were 
most likely claimants under the Wabash deed or their heirs and successors, 
perhaps spurred on by their strapped partners in the east. 
The territorial secretary, Winthrop Sargent, reminded these petitioners 
of the long-standing rule against private grants and scolded them for as-
serting a claim "so wildly set up." Some of the petitioners, Sargent implied, 
had made claims to the same lands on more tenable grounds, and he rhe-
torically asked, "why my Friends have we been making these requests, if 
the Claim you propose to me is just?" He refused even to raise the issue in 
43. United Companies, 1796 Memorial, 28, 47; Report of the Committee To whom was 
referred, on the 13th ultimo, The Memorial of the Illinois and Wabash Land Company, Feb. 
3, 1797 (Early American Imprints, 1st series, no. 33,032). 
44. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (no. 16,857) (Circuit Ct. Pa., 1795); United 
Companies, 1797 Memorial, Appendix Ill, 6-7. The Memorial quoted the case without a 
citation. 
45. Charles Page Smith, James Wilson, Founding Father (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1956), 382-94; Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Robert Morris: Patriot and Financier 
(New York: B. Franklin, 1903), 55. 
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Washington, claiming that it would undermine legitimate claims, and ac-
cused the petitioners of appearing to be "not Men, but Children."46 
In 1802 and 1803, the Companies submitted memorials to Congress that 
contained little if any new material; Congress again summarily refused to 
recognize the claims. They then took a stab at administrative relief in the 
territories, petitioning the commissioners adjudicating the morass of land 
claims at Vincennes in 1804. Clear directions from Washington, however, 
barred recognition of the Companies' deeds for the same old reason: the 
United States would never validate "treaties made betwet:n the Indians and 
private persons." In 1805, the secretary of the treasury summed up the 
consensus view of the Companies' claims: "[they] have not the shadow of 
a title to support their claim ... I speak with perfect confidence on this 
point, because I have read all the Memorials of the Companies and never 
heard of a more frivolous claim." Two years later the secretary made clear 
that the United States would have "no hesitation" removing claimants un-
der the Companies' deedsY 
The Companies were dormant until 1810. In that year they submitted a 
fresh memorial to Congress, apparently authored by a new shareholder, the 
prominent Supreme Court litigator and land speculator Robert Goodloe 
Harper.48 While formally maintaining a right to the entirety of the lands 
described in. two deeds, the Companies were "ready to admit, that the 
measures adapted by the Government for the defence and settlement of the 
neighboring country have greatly enhanced the value of this property" and 
hence were willing to yield a portion of their lands. On the other hand, the 
Companies argued that they had rendered a valuable service to the United 
States: the nation, the memorial declared, had paid an unusually low price 
to the Indians for lands recently purchased that overlapped with the Com-
46. Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States. 2:490-92 (Oct. 28, 1797). 
47. United Companies, Memorial of /802 (Early American Imprints, 2d series, no. 3191); 
United Companies, /803 Memorial; United Companies, Memorial of 1810, reprinted in 
American State Papers, Public lAnds, 2: 110; Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 
7:205-8, 311-12, 329, 445; Logan Esarey, ed., Messages and Lettas of William Henry 
Harrison (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922), I: I 02. 
48. Harper argued (often with co-counsel) at least eighty-six cases between 1806 and 1825. 
Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file (March 12, 1997). In addition to Johnson v. 
M'lntosh, he argued such leading cases as Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 
( 1806) (requiring complete diversity between litigants in order to invoke federal courts' di-
versity jurisdiction) [Harper's first Supreme Court case, successfully argued] and Fletcher 
v. Peck, I 0 U.S. ( 6 Cranch) 87 ( 181 0) (holding that the Contract Clause barred Georgia from 
rescinding grants made as part of the Yazoo scheme). Harper served as the Yazoo Compa-
ny's Philadelphia agent in 1791. Charles William Sommerville, Robert Goodloe Harper 
(Washington: Neale, 1899), 7. Apparently he purchased some shares himself. He also in-
vested in the North American Land Company and authored at least part of a pamphlet sup-
porting its claims. 
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panies' tracts. Balancing the benefits that each side provided the other, the 
memorial proposed one of the Companies' most generous compromises: 
that the United States grant the Companies title to the portion of the sec-
ond (southern) grant in the Wabash Company deed east of the Wabash 
River. This would have left the Companies with roughly an eighth of the 
lands they originally purchased.49 
Congress rejected the memorial of 1810 on the same grounds used by 
the British to reject the companies' claims before the Revolution: it con-
tradicted the then-governing Proclamation of 1763 and the universal rule, 
introduced "at a pretty early day ... regulating the intercourse with Indi-
an tribes, which requires the concomitant assent or subsequent sanction of 
the Government to a conveyance of lands by Indians, in order to render it 
valid." The Committee on Public Lands did admit that "a few solitary in-
stances may be found, in the early settlement of the country, of Indian deeds 
of land being recognised as valid," but refused to make any more such 
exceptions. Questioning whether the earlier purchases allowed the U.S. to 
buy the same Indian land more cheaply, the committee found that, even 
admitting this, "to recognize such unauthorized proceedings of individu-
als with the Indians ... would encroach upon the great system of policy 
so wisely introduced to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes."50 
The last recorded corporate act in the Companies' minutes is the gift of 
a share in 1812. The Companies resubmitted the 1810 memorial, with only 
trivial additions in 1816, but Congress never even bothered to respond. The 
Companies' next stop would be federal court. Litigation requires an adver-
sary, however, and until the United States extinguished Indian title and sold 
land within the tracts purchased by the Companies, there was no way to 
test title in a lawsuit. 
The Companies did not have to wait long. By the early 1800s the Unit-
ed States had extinguished most Indian claims in Ohio and began purchas-
ing numerous tracts in Indiana and Illinois that intersected with the Com-
panies' claims. It took a negotiator willing to cut a few corners to buy Indian 
lands. General St. Clair "had been ordered to purchase cessions from the 
Indians, but on his first visit he was unable to discover any nation with a 
clear title to the southern lands of Illinois." William Henry Harrison, who 
negotiated all the major treaties discussed in this section, had no such com-
punction, "showing a readiness to enter into negotiations with any faction 
49. United Companies, 1810 Memorial, 111, 116. The Companies offered, as an alterna-
tive, to take debt certificates equal in value to the land, to be paid off from land sale pro-
ceeds. 
50. American State Papers, Public Lands, 2:253 (Report of Committee on Public Lands, 
Jan. 10, 1811). Congress cited the long list ofthe colonial statutes against private land pur-
chases discussed in the first part of this article. 
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or isolated band of Indians who would consent to a relinquishment of land 
titles ... "51 
Before Harrison negotiated any major land cessions, President Jefferson 
made two important points to him regarding negotiations with the Illinois 
tribes. First, in an interesting addendum to the discovery rule, Jefferson 
asserted that the United States took title to the lands of any tribes that be-
came extinct. Applying this law to the facts at hand, he noted that "[t]he 
Cahokias [an Illinois tribe] having been extirpated by the Sacs, we have a 
right to their lands in preference to any Indian tribe, in virtue of our per-
manent sovereignty over it." Similarly, Jefferson claimed for the nation a 
"strip along the southern bank of the Illinois River ... because it was the 
property of the Peoria Indians who had become extinct." He also advised 
Harrison that the Kaskaskias, another Illinois tribe, were reduced to "a few 
families, exposed to numerous enemies, and unable to defend themselves, 
and would cede lands in exchange for protection." 
Harrison appears to have heeded this advice when, in August 1803, he 
obtained all the lands in the Illinois Company's deed and more in a huge 
8.9 million acre cession from the Illinois tribes. The cession specifically 
notes the tribes were "reduced to a very small number ... unable to occu-
PY the extensive tract of country which of right belongs to them . . . "And 
although he did obtain signatures from the supposedly extinct Cahokias, 
he did not bother looking for representatives of the Peorias. The meager 
surviving bands ceded their lands in large part for the protection of the 
United States, as anticipated by Jefferson and promised in article two of 
the treaty: 
Neighboring Indians disputed the titJe of such a "decimated and impo-
tent tribe" to so vast a territory, and there was "considerable doubt as to 
their rightful claim to the land they had ceded." A recent account labeled 
the 1803 treaty with the Illinois tribes as "[t]he most notorious" of Harri-
son's dealings with tribes having only tenuous claims to lands ceded. Har-
rison dealt with "the remnants of the Kaskaskias under Ducoigne, a band 
that numbered, according to the United States, only 30 men, women, and 
children in 1796 but that ceded [all of] southern Illinois [and much of cen-
tral Illinois] to the United States ... "52 
51. Alvord, lllinois Country, 416. 
52. "Hints on the Subject of Indian Boundaries, Suggested for Consideration" (Dec. 29, 
1802), in Albert E. Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Wa:;hington, D.C.: Tho-
mas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1907), 17:375; Dwight L. Smith, "Indian Land Ces-
sions in the Old Northwest, 1795-1809" (Ph.D. diss. , Indiana University, 1949), 257; 7 Stat. 
78, 200 (1803); Treat; The National Land System, 404 (giving acreage of tract) . For maps 
of this and the other cessions cited, see Royce, Indian Land Cessions, pis. 124-26; Smith, 
"Indian Land Sessions," 245, citing letter from William Henry Harrison to Secretary of War 
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When Harrison began buying lands in the area of the Wabash Compa-
ny's claims, the United States, otherwise disdainful of Indian deeds, de-
cided to take a page from the United Companies' book. Secretary of War 
Henry Dearborn counseled Harrison to convince the Piankashaw and Kick-
apoo tribes to cede their lands, without payment, based on the earlier sale 
to the Wabash Company. Apparently, however, this plan was foiled by other 
tribes' vehement objection that the Piankashaw had lacked the right to sell 
the lands in the first place. 53 
In part because the United States had to deal with so many tribes, ac-
quisition of the lands described in the Wabash Company's deed occurred 
through a series of cessions. Accepting the weakness of the Piankashaw's 
claim to all the lands sold to the Wabash Company, the federal government 
bought 2.8 million acres that included the first (northern) parcel in the 
Company's deed, in the fall of 1809, from a group of five other tribes and 
never paid the Piankashaws a cent. The Piankashaws were among the tribes 
ceding lands included in the second (southern) parcel they granted to the 
Wabash Company, but they were not alone.54 
The United States began surveying these purchases, a necessary prereq-
uisite to sales, almost immediately after finalizing the treaties and opened 
land offices at Vincennes, Indiana, and Kaskaskia, Illinois, in 1804. The 
War of 1812 and the uprising led by Tecumseh and his brother, the Proph-
et (Tenskwatawa), however, delayed the process of bringing any land in 
Illinois to market. Before these conflagrations, however, the United States 
did sell a significant amount of land in the Vincennes district, overlapping 
both of the Wabash Company's parcels. 55 
This presents a puzzle. Why did the plaintiffs in M 'lntosh not bring their 
Dearborn, March 3, 1805 (manuscript in the Esarey Collection) (claiming fear of Potowat-
omis was main reasons Kaskaskians agreed to treaty of cession); Reginald Horsman, Ex-
pansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812 (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 1967), 146; Treat, The National Land System, 169; White, The Middle Ground, 474 
n.6. 
53. Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 7:46-47, 53-54.; Moses Dawson, A 
Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Services of Major-General William H. Harri-
son (Cincinnati: Dawson/Advertiser, 1824), 25-26. 
54.7 Stat. 81 (Delaware; 1804); 7 Stat. 83 (Piankashaws; 1804); 7 Stat. 91 , 100 (Mia-
mis; 1805); 7 Stat. 113 (Miamis including Eel Rivers, Delawares, and Potowatomis; 1809); 
7 Stat. 116 (Weas; 1809); 7 Stat. 117 (Kickapoos; 1809). 
55. Joseph W. Ernst, "With Compass and Chain: The Federal Land Surveyors in the Old 
Northwest, 1785-1816" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1958), 251 (map); Malcolm J. 
Rohrbough, The Land Office Business: The Settlement and Administration of American Public 
Lands, 1789-1837 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 28; Congressional Informa-
tion Service, Index to Presidential Executive Orders and Proclamations ( 1986) (CIS no. 1806-
52-13), I :65 (announcing commencement of land sales at Vincennes on October 10, 1806). 
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suit as soon as sales were made in the Vincennes district, instead of wait-
ing until 1820 to file, alleging conflicts with later sales out of the Kaskaskia 
office? One possibility is that they did not want to litigate in a territorial 
court. Hence they waited until Indiana and Illinois achieved statehood (in 
1816 and 1818 respectively). The next section offers a different explana-
tion: the litigation was driven by the coincidence of the death of a claim-
ant (Thomas Johnson) and the identity of his executor (Robert Goodloe 
Harper). 
E. The Litigation of Johnson v. M'lntosh 
In their first years of service, officials at the Kaskaskia, Illinois, land office 
devoted themselves almost exclusively to sorting out the tangle of preex-
isting French, British, and early American claims over southern Illinois 
lands. New business picked up when surveyors finished their work in the 
district and Congress passed a "preemption" act giving occupiers and im-
provers (squatters) the right to purchase their claims at the statutory min-
imum price of two dollars an acre. Like most preemption acts, Congress 
limited individual claims to a single quarter section (160 acres). Preemp-
tioners purchased about 110,000 acres from 1814 to 1815. The president 
(Madison) finally proclaimed open market land sales, by auction, on May 
16, 1816, and business boomed.56 
This chronology raises questions about the purchases by the defendant 
in M'lntosh, William Mcintosh. 57 He obtained the lands at issue in the case 
56. 2 Stat. 446, 447 ( 1807) (declaring need for more time to clear up claims in Kaskaskia 
district); 2 Stat. 607 ( 181 0) (confirming claims approved by Kaskaskia commissioners made 
through 1809); 2 Stat. 677 ( 1812) (reexamining existing claims and permitting new claims 
in Kaskaskia district); Solon J. Buck, Illinois in 1818 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1967), 53; 2 Stat. 797 (1813). Congress twice extended the time period for preemptive claims 
in the Kaskaskia district. 3 Stat. 307 ( 1816); 3 Stat. 218 (1815); 2 Stat. 797 ( 1813). 
57. William Mcintosh apparently emigrated to America from Scotland after his father 
joined Bonnie Prince Charles's failed uprising and thus forfeited the family estate. Milo M. 
Quaife, ed., John Askin Papers (Detroit: Detroit Library Commission, 1928), I :293-94 n.15. 
He served in the King's army during the Revolutionary War, rising to the rank of major. 
Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 7:669 (Letter from Governor Harrison to the 
Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin, Vincennes, Aug. 29, 1809); Letter to the Western World, 
Extra, Frankfort, Thursday, March 3, 1808, ibid., 8:94. After the war, Mcintosh appeared as 
an attorney in Vincennes and resided there until at least 1816; at some date thereafter he 
moved to Grand Rapid, near Palmyra, Illinois. John Askin Papers, 1:328 n.75. He served as 
treasurer of the Indiana Territory circa 1804 and, like many other frontier officials, "jumped 
in at the very beginning of [his] residence in the new territories to acquire [land] claims . .. " 
Gates, The Public Lands, 92; Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 7:194 (Letter 
from Michael Jones, Register of Land Office at Kaskaskia, to the Secretary of the Treasury, 
from Kaskaskia, May 18, 1804). 
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(fifty-three tracts amounting to nearly 12,000 acres) on April 24, 1815, 
before the first public sales.58 The law limited preemption claims to 160 
acres, and it is extremely doubtful that Mcintosh had claims dating from 
British or French rule to over 11,000 acres scattered all over southern Illi-
nois, How, then, did Mcintosh manage to get patents from the federal gov-
ernment to all this land, at the statutory minimum price, before the gov-
ernment auctioned it to the public? There are two possibilities, both 
consistent with what little is known of William Mcintosh. 
First, Mcintosh may have engaged in a massive fraud, claiming pre-
emptive or colonial rights to acreage one hundred times the per person 
limit. This undoubtedly would have required the assistance, or at least 
the acquiescence, of a local land office employee. Mcintosh helped the 
register of the Kaskaskia land office, Michael Jones, obtain his job and 
"politely offered to become [one of Jones's] sureties." There is no direct 
evidence that Jones assisted Mcintosh in any malfeasance, but land office 
registers could, and did, assist in myriad land frauds on the frontier. Given 
the size of Mcintosh's claims, however, it seems probable that officials 
in Washington would have noticed any irregularity, and so outright fraud 
seems unlikely. 
It is more likely, and consonant with a large body of evidence, that 
Mcintosh obtained these lands from preemptioners and colonial claimants 
in return for legal services rendered to help establish their claims. He served 
as the voice of French claimants in southern Indiana and Illinois as early 
as 1803, and William Henry Harrison, governor of the territories, identified 
Mcintosh as one of the "the principal councellors of the Kaskaskias Spec-
William Mcintosh spelled and signed his last name with a "c" instead of an apostrophe, 
yet the Supreme Court used an apostrophe. 
58. District Court Records of Johnson v. M 'Intosh, National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration, Record Group 267 (Supreme Court Case Files), Microfilm M214 ( 1792-1831 ), 
Roll 56, Frame 410 (hereafter District Court Records of Johnson v. M'Intosh) (copy of 
Mcintosh's patents). The district court records of Mcintosh's purchases match exactly pat-
ents issued to him as recorded in a database of all United States patents issued for land in 
Illinois. gopher://gopher.uic.edu:70/ll/library/libdb/landsale/ (State of Illinois, Archives, 
Public Domain Land Tract Sales Archive). The Supreme Court dates the purchases three years 
later, in 1818, when the federal government issued patents. Johnson v. M' Intosh, 560. Such 
delays between purchase and issuance of patent were common. Rohrbough, The Land Office 
Business, 175. The Supreme Court's acreage count, 11,560 acres, based on the parties' stip-
ulated facts, appears to be off a bit; the land records indicate that Mcintosh purchased 
11,982.81 acres (forty-four quarter sections, one half section, six sections, a fractional sec-
tion [521.21 acres] and a fractional half section [260.6 acres]). According to the State of 
Illinois Public Domain Land Tract Sales Archive database cited above, Mcintosh paid the 
statutory minimum two dollars per acre for each and every parcel. 
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ulators ... " It is strange, however, that Mcintosh chose to file all these 
claims, accumulated over ten years or more, on a single day.59 
By some accounts, Mcintosh was not faithful to his clients, or to the law, 
in providing legal guidance in return for a portion of land claims. "By 
magnifying the difficulty of obtaining confirmations and other vile decep-
tions, upon those illiterate and credulous people, he succeeded frequently 
in obtaining 200 out of 400 acres, for barely presenting the claim." Gover-
nor (later President) Harrison accused Mcintosh of controlling an "illiter-
ate Ignorant Irishman ... possessed of a large property" and cited docu-
ments purporting "to shew Mcintosh guilty of perjury ... [Mcintosh] will 
swear any falsehood whatever to gain any of his purposes ... the greatest 
stigma I shall incur is that of having my name Coupled with [Mcintosh and 
other] such Scoundrels ... " It is likely that Mcintosh suborned perjury. 
"Mcintosh had written in the English language, two depositions, to be 
sworn to by a Frenchman, who could neither write, read, nor speak one 
word of English ... " When this Frenchman appeared before the land com-
missioners, he "declared with horror in his countenance, that he had never 
sworn to the facts there stated, and that if they really contained those facts, 
they had been inserted by Mcintosh, without his knowledge or consent." 
These sources, however, must be read with a grain of salt. Although Har-
rison and Mcintosh began as partners in purchasing lands at the rapids of 
the Wabash River in 1800, they had a falling out in 1804. Mcintosh opposed 
Harrison's desire to advance the Indiana Territory closer to statehood, since 
the administrative costs involved would require levying higher property tax-
es-anathema to a land speculator like Mcintosh. The two publicly traded 
barbs. Mcintosh apparently went too far by accusing Harrison of cheating 
the Indians, and Harrison obtained a $4000 libel judgment.60 
59. Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 7:194 (Letter from Michael Jones, 
Register of Land Office at Kaskaskia, to the Secretary of the Treasury, from Kaskaskia, May 
18, 1804); ibid., 125 (Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of Knox, St. Clair, and Randolph 
Counties, Oct. 22, 1803); ibid., 503 (Memorial on behalf of French claimants of Vincennes-
William Mcintosh to the President, Dec. 15, 1807); ibid., 536-38 (William Mcintosh to the 
President, March 30, 1808); ibid., 612 (Memorial to Congress by Inhabitants of Knox Coun-
ty) (Israel Rouland signed "by Will: Mcintosh his agent"); ibid., 669 (Letter from Governor 
Harrison to the Secretary of the Treasury, Gallatin, Vincennes, Aug. 29, 1809). 
60. Letter to the Western World, in Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 8:94-
99; ibid., 93-94 (Deposition of Newton E. Westfall, Jan. 23, 1811 ); ibid., 81 (Deposition of 
Judge Vanderburgh, Jan 14, 1811 ); Dawson, A Historical Narrative, 78; Francis S. Philbrick, 
ed., The Laws of Indiana Territory 180/-/809, vol. 21 of the Collections of the Illinois State 
Historical Library, Law Series vol. 2, xxvi. An anonymous ally of Harrison described how 
Mcintosh avoided a duel and mocked him for "his unutterable aversion to the smell of gun-
powder. He surely is the veriest coward that ever bit the dust." 
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The historical record of the plaintiffs in M'Intosh is less colorful. Tho-
mas Johnson, an original investor in the Wabash Company, was the first gov-
ernor of the state of Maryland and served briefly on the United States Su-
preme Court from 1791 to 1792. He died on or about Nov. 1, 1819. The 
plaintiffs, his son Joshua and grandson Thomas Graham, were the primary 
beneficiaries of his will. Perhaps more importantly for the commencement 
of the M'lntosh litigation, the will made Robert Goodloe Harper executor 
of the estate. Harper apparently determined that Johnson's estate owned 
shares and decided to go to court in a final stab at a happy ending to the 
long and sad story of the United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies.61 
Looking for a federal patent holder to sue, as a test of the validity of their 
claim under the Wabash Company's Indian deed, Johnson and Graham, 
probably led by Harper, targeted Mcintosh. As one of the largest landhold-
ers in the Illinois and Indiana territories, Mcintosh was a natural adversary, 
but he does not appear to have been a real one. Mapping the United Com-
panies' claims alongside Mcintosh's purchases as enumerated in the dis-
trict court records shows that the litigants' land claims do not overlap. 
Hence there was no real "case or controversy" between the parties and the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction. Even so, the record makes clear that the 
defendant Mcintosh made no effort to dispute the plaintiffs' questionable 
assertion that the parties' claims conflicted. In addition, the courts did noth-
ing to establish the existence of a true dispute between the litigants. It is 
impossible to determine whether the parties and the courts were negligently 
ignorant, willfully ignorant, or knowing participants in yet another early 
Supreme Court case that was arranged by parties who knew or should have 
known that no true conflict existed.62 Everyone, it seems, wanted a Supreme 
Court decision deciding once and for all whether private purchases from 
the Indians were valid. 
Given the location of his properties, it is at first puzzling that the plain-
tiffs contended that Mcintosh's patents conflicted with the Wabash Com-
pany's southern tract. The Supreme Court opinion specifically limited the 
controversy to claims "by the plaintiffs, under a purchase and conveyance 
from the Piankashaw Indians"-grantors to the Wabash Company only. As 
the map shows, none of Mcintosh's tracts come within fifty miles of the 
61. Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., The Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court 1789-1969, 1:149-58; Letter from Roger Taney to Robert Goodloe Harper, Dec. 4, 
1822, in Harper Papers, Legal Correspondence, 1797-1824, Maryland Historical Society 
Collection (Manuscript 1884, accession number 55,644). 
62. See map above, 68; Magrath, Yazoo (showing that Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. [6 Cranch] 
87 [1810], resolving Yazoo land case, was feigned); Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in 
United States History (Boston: Little, Brown, 1926), 1:147 (arguing that Hylton v. United 
States, 3 U.S. [3 Dall.] 171 [1796] was feigned). 
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Wabash Company's claims. It would have been more plausible to argue that 
Mcintosh had claims that conflicted with the Illinois Company's southern 
tract.63 
Real property law at the time, however, may have required the plain-
tiffs to assert claims under the Wabash Company deed, since they took their 
interest from a grantee in that deed (Thomas Johnson). While the United 
Companies' articles stated that, on _unification, they held their lands "in 
common," there is no record that they executed deeds conveying mutual 
coownership interests. Without such a formality, it is doubtful that courts 
in the 1820s would have recognized any real property interest of succes-
sors in interest under the Wabash Company deed to the lands described in 
the Illinois Company deed. Hence the plaintiffs claimed, and the defendant 
and courts agreed, to what the map shows is clearly not possible: that 
Mcintosh's property overlapped the southern Wabash Company tract. 
There is other evidence to support the contention that the parties either 
feigned their dispute or that the defendant and the courts declined to take 
even the simplest steps to verify the existence of a true controversy. If the 
plaintiffs simply wanted to get into court based on any of the four tracts in 
either of the two deeds, they could have done so easily. M'Intosh bought a 
piece of land clearly within the southern tract of the Illinois Company in 
1819.64 Probably the plaintiffs did not mention this tract because they felt 
that they had no standing to sue on the Illinois Company deed. Instead they 
grounded their complaint on other tracts owned by Mcintosh that were 
closer to Wabash Company claims-though not close in absolute terms, as 
the map shows. 
Mcintosh stipulated to every fact alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction-
al and otherwise. Perhaps he participated in framing the complaint, which 
became the stipulated facts of the case. Neither the district court nor the 
Supreme Court ever questioned any of these facts. Again, all parties seemed 
determined to obtain a legal ruling whether or not the facts showed that 
the litigants had conflicting land claims. 
The plaintiffs' case commenced in the United States District Court for 
Illinois in December 1820, in Vandalia, Illinois, Judge Nathaniel Pope pre-
siding. The complaint, following the traditional formalities and fictions of 
ejectment, claimed that the plaintiffs had a lessee, Simeon Peaceable, who 
was ousted by a claimant, Thomas Troublesome, invoking rights conferred 
63. District Court Records of Johnson v. M 'lntosh, Frame 414 (summarizing stipulated 
facts); Johnson v. M'lntosh, 543 (emphasis added). 
64. Mcintosh purchased Township 14 South, Range I East, on September 24, I 8 I 9 (shown 
on map above, 68), over a year before the plaintiffs filed their case. State of Illinois Public 
Domain Land Tract Sales Archive database (data record no. I 66, I 28). 
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by the defendant Mcintosh. Such "rigorous adherence to the antiquated 
technicalities of English law" was common in frontier federal courts, and 
thus they 
retained the ancient pleadings of ejectment cases, with lengthy fictitious ex-
changes between mythical legal contestants . . . John Doe, Richard Roe, John 
Den, Richard Fen, and many other characters with ingenious alliterative names 
continued to sue one another throughout this period ... sometimes the attor-
neys exercised their ingenuity and litigated cases in the names of Richard 
Peaceable and Henry Troublesome, Samuel Seekright and Solomon Spend-
all, Elder Grant and Void Claim, suggesting a bias toward the plaintiff.65 
The court swore in a jury of twelve men, but immediately, on agreement 
of both parties, "for certain causes" removed one juror (Thomas Ray), at 
which point the court discharged the rest of the jury and gave the parties 
leave "to make a stated and agreed case of facts for the consideration of 
the Court ... "Dismissing a juror was apparently the standard procedural 
mechanism in this era to dispense with a jury trial and instead let the judge 
decide the case on a paper record. Without providing any substantive opin-
ion, the court rendered judgment for the defendant. In yet another piece 
of evidence that both sides wanted a definitive judgment on the validity of 
Indian deeds, Mcintosh waived his right to force the plaintiffs to post an 
appeal bond. 66 
II. The Supreme Court's Opinion 
A. Arguments and Holding 
The plaintiff filed a writ of error in the Supreme Court on February 5, 1822, 
"by consent"-one more indication that Mcintosh wanted the case heard 
65. District Court Records of Johnson v. M'Intosh, Frame 422; Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, 
Federal Courts in the Early Republic: Kentucky, 1789-1816 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1978), 77, 84, 177 n.24. For biographical information on Pope, see 30 Fed. Cas. 
1391 (Bibliographic Notes of the Federal Judges); Paul M. Angle, "Nathaniel Pope, 1784-
1850," in Illinois State Hist. Soc'y, Transactions for Year 1936. The Great Chicago Fire 
consumed most of Pope's, and the Illinois District Court's, early records. Charles Davey (or 
Dewey-the handwritten transcript is unclear) represented the plaintiff; research failed to 
uncover any biographical information on him. Henry Starr represented the defendant Mcin-
tosh. Starr practiced out of Kaskaskia and had a partner, Blackwell, who worked in Belleville, 
Illinois. Advertisement, Illinois 1ntelligencer (April 14, 1819), vol. 3, no. 33, 4. 
66. District Court Records in Johnson v. M'lntosh, Frame 347. "[J]uries were often dis-
charged without making a finding. The technique usually employed for dismissing a jury 
was to withdraw a juror, 'whereupon the jury was discharged."' Tachau, Federal Courts in 
the Early Republic, 88. 
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at the highest level despite his victory in district court. Unsurprisingly, 
Robert Goodloe Harper served as counsel for the plaintiffs, along with 
Daniel Webster. Webster's fame as a Supreme Court litigator in the early 
republic is well known; unfortunately there is no direct reference to the 
M'Intosh case in his extensive surviving papers.67 Harper, as discussed 
above, was also a preeminent Supreme Court lawyer of his era. Although 
there is little discussion of the case in his surviving papers, Harper did make 
inquiries as far afield as London in trying to build a case.68 General Will-
iam H. Winder, another prominent Supreme Court litigator, along with 
Henry M. Murray, who apparently joined the Supreme Court bar specifi-
cally for this case and never appeared in the Court again,69 presented the 
case for the defendant Mcintosh. Argument took four days, and only nine 
days later the Court affirmed the district court's judgment for the defendant.70 
The bulk of Webster's and Harper's reported argument for the plaintiffs 
focuses on narrow statutory issues. They claimed (i) that banning the pur-
chase of lands from a foreign sovereign was a legislative act beyond the 
power of the Crown acting without consent of Parliament, and thus that the 
Proclamation of 1763, a purely administrative act, was void; and (ii) that 
67. National Archives and Records Administration, microcopy series 216 (Supreme Court 
Docket Sheets), frame 408. The Supreme Court received the district court records almost a 
year before the plaintiff finally filed the writ of error. Ibid. An index of all of Webster's let-
ters and an even more detailed index of microfilms containing his complete works contain 
not a single cite to Johnson v. M'lntosh. See Alfred S. Konefsky and Andrew J. King, eds., 
The Papers of Daniel Webster: Legal Papers, 1798-1824 (Hanover, N.H.: Published for 
Dartmouth College by the University Press of New England, 1982), I :383-475; Microfilms 
of Daniel Webster s Papers (Charles Wiltse, ed. 1974). In a letter written about a month before 
he argued the case, Webster in passing mentioned working on a case with Harper and re-
quested a pamphlet on the Mohegan case, a famous and interminable Connecticut land dis-
pute. Webster Microfilms, Reel4, Frame 3384 (Letter from Webster to Daggett, January 7, 
1823). 
68. In early 1822, Harper wrote to Thomas Aspinwall in London: "Will you be so good, 
my dear Sir, as to inform me at your earliest convenience, of the result and expense of the 
inquiries which you were so good as to make for the Illinois and Wabash companies, at my 
instance." He apparently received no reply; in an addendum to a copy of this Jetter, here-
newed the request. Letter from Harper to Aspinwall, Jan. 13, 1822, with addendum dated 
April 25, 1822. Harper Papers, Legal Correspondence, 1797-1824, Maryland Historical 
Society Collection (Manuscript 1884, accession number 57,784). 
69. Murray joined the Supreme Court bar on Feb. 27, 1822, a month before the plaintiffs 
filed their writ of error; no residence is given. National Archives and Records Administra-
tion, Record Group 267 (Supreme Court Case Files), Microfilm M217 (Attorney Signatures), 
Roll I. A computer search did not reveal another Murray arguing in the Supreme Court before 
the Civil War. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file (March 12, 1997). 
70. The case was argued February 15 and February 17-19, 1823; judgment was entered 
on Friday, February 28, 1823. National Archives and Records Administration, microcopy 
series 216 (Supreme Court Docket Sheets), frame 408. 
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a colonial Virginia statute enacted in 1662, banning such purchases, had 
lapsed (or been repealed), and that its reenactment in 1779, after the Unit-
ed Companies' purchases, could not divest the companies of previously 
vested rights. 
Chief Justice Marshall, in a brief detour toward the end of the Court's 
unanimous opinion, rejected both contentions out of hand. Bluntly disagree-
ing with the plaintiffs' first point, he declared that the Crown retained ex-
clusive power to deal with "vacant lands," including Indian lands, as it 
pleased. Much more peculiar was Marshall's response to the supposedly 
lapsed, and tardily reenacted, Virginia statute banning private purchases. 
The only evidence that the statute of 1662 had been repealed, it seems, was 
a "marginal note opposite to the title of the law, forbidding purchases from 
the Indians, in the revisals of the Virginia statutes, stating that law [the 1662 
statute] to be repealed." Marshall did not argue that a marginal note be-
side a title was insufficient evidence that the legislature had repealed the 
statute; indeed, he explicitly refused to recognize that the 1779 law could 
"countervail the testimony furnished by the marginal note"; instead he 
found that the 1779 law could "safely be considered as an unequivocal 
affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle which had always 
been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians re-
sided in the govemment."71 
We will return to what Marshall meant by "broad principles . .. al-
ways ... maintained." But there is a more immediate question: why did 
Marshall not limit his opinion to these two points? If either the Proclama-
tion of 1763 or the Virginia colonial statute of 1662 was good law at the 
time of the United Companies' purchases, then the Companies' purchases 
were clearly illegal. A contemporary New York case rejected an Indian deed 
precisely on such narrow grounds.72 The main difference between this ap-
proach and the broader rule Marshall enunciated is that a more limited 
ruling would leave loopholes for future litigation. For instance, what if a 
colony had a lapsed statute and some speculators made purchases before 
the Proclamation of 1763? Marshall apparently thought the stakes were 
important enough to warrant a universal rule barring private purchases from 
the Indians. 
Scholars have justly complained about the "tumbling logic" of Marshall's 
opinion and its "conflicting and confusing potpourri of arguments." Yet 
71. Johnson v. M'/ntosh, 585, 595-96. Marshall distinguished the plaintiffs' primary sup-
porting case, Campbell v. Hall, I Cowp. Rep. 204 (1774), as involving royal imposition of 
a tax. Parliament, not the Crown, had the exclusive power to tax. 
72. Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johnson's Reports 693 (N.Y. 1823) (refusing to recognize In-
dian grant based on exhaustive analysis of New York Constitution of 1777, article 37, and a 
long line of colonial and state statutes forbidding land transactions with the Indians). 
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there is an underlying structure to the opinion, and we can distill the argu-
ments from Marshall's "conflicting and confusing potpourri" and assess 
each in tum. We have already seen, for example, that the Proclamation of 
1763 and colonial statutes were too narrow to support a more general hold-
ing. We can ignore most other arguments in Marshall's opinion as mere 
dicta unnecessary to decide the case.73 
In order to find the true holding, we must start with the question Mar-
shall proposed to answer. Here, at least, in its very first paragraph, the 
opinion is crystal clear: "the question is, whether [the United Companies'] 
title can be recognised in the Courts of the United States?" The key clause 
is the last one, "in the Courts of the United States." Marshall repeated this 
phrase in the second paragraph of the opinion and again in the last para-
graph. It at first seems superfluous; what courts, other than the courts of 
the United States, could possibly be relevant to the dispute? 
The answer is Indian courts. Marshall laid out the two tiers governing 
rights in American lands: the discovery rule that regulated inter-European 
claims and "[t]hose relations which were to exist between the discoverer 
and the natives." The Indians' rights to their lands, defined in the second 
tier, "were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a 
considerable extent, impaired." The discovery rule itself, Marshall noted, 
prevented the Indians from selling to other sovereigns. Under colonial prac-
tice, however, the Indians were not stripped of all rights; they retained what 
Marshall labeled the "Indian title of occupancy," which could be extin-
guished only "by purchase or by conquest." 
The plaintiffs, then, via their predecessor (a member of the Wabash 
Company and then the United Companies), purchased this Indian title of 
occupancy. Since they purchased Indian title, Marshall directed them to an 
Indian forum for a remedy. 
[The plaintiffs hold] under [the Indians], by a title dependent on their laws. 
The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and if they [the Illinois and 
Piankashaw tribes] choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of 
their land, the Courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection 
of the title. The person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their 
territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property pur-
chased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. 
73. Henderson, "Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title," 87; David E. Wilkins, 
"Johnson v. M'lntosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States," American 
Indian Law Review 19 (1994): 166-67. Marshall's opinion cites few precedents, and all are 
tangential to the main doctrines established by Johnson v. M'lntosh. Research into lower 
federal court, colonial, and state court decisions uncovered only one antecedent opinion 
anticipating Marshall's approach: Marshall v. Clark, 4 Call 268 (Virginia 1792), a land dis-
pute between Marshall's father and George Rogers Clark. 
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Included in the Indians' title of occupancy was the power to sell lands to 
the discovering sovereign that a tribe had previously conveyed to some-
one else. Thus, as Ball puts it, "[t]he plaintiffs' claim to the land was de-
feated principally because the Indians themselves had extinguished plain-
tiffs' interest" by the later sale to the United States.74 
Marshall, then, created the rather strange two-tiered land tenure system 
described in the first part of this article: Indian title of occupancy applied 
before American purchase or conquest, the common law of the several 
states applied after. The courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over 
claims based on Indian title of occupancy. The dual land tenure system 
explains why the plaintiffs lost the case: they purchased the Indian title of 
occupancy, which the Indians could and did extinguish, under the law of 
the United States, by reselling to the United States. 
B. Marshall's Version of Indian Title 
What is less clear in M 'Intosh is the precise contours of the Indian title of 
occupancy. The most important question for the Indians, given that they 
could sell full title only to the United States, was whether they could refuse 
to sell. Marshall's black letter rule, that the United States could divest the 
Indians of title only via purchase or conquest, was consistent with earlier 
doctrine. The word conquest was subsequently limited to "defensive wars" 
or those fought for some other "just cause." In addition to purchase and 
just conquest, later cases held that the Indians could lose their title of oc-
cupancy by abandonment.75 Outside of these elaborations, the Supreme 
Court has never altered the rules established in M 'Intosh. 
74. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 571-72, 573,574,587,593, 604-5; Ball, "Constitution, Court, 
Indian Tribes," 25; Henderson, "Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title," 93-96. Marshall 
knew full well, of course, that there was no Indian court to hear the plaintiffs' grievance. In 
the very next sentence, he observed, "[i]f they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which 
can revise and set aside the proceeding." Johnson v. M'lntosh, 593. 
75. Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 4:35 (declaration by President Jeffer-
son that Indians retained "full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose 
to keep it, and that this might be forever"); Smith, Indian Land Cessions in the Old North-
west, 213-14, citing Speech of Jefferson to Tribes, April 22, 1808 (counseling Indians that 
in negotiating to sell land, "you have been free to do as you please, your lands are your 
own ... to keep or sell as you please ... "); Worcester, 31 U.S. 545. Abandonment explains 
Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 513 (1852), where the court ruled that the holder under 
a federal patent could adversely possess against the Indians, despite the failure of the gov-
ernment to extinguish Indian title. Without appealing to abandonment as the basis for ex-
tinguishing title, this case would be inconsistent with Johnson v. M'lntosh, empowering 
a private citizen to do by occupation what she could not do by purchase. The court formally 
declared that abandonment can extinguish Indian title in Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 
U.S. 434, 437 (1917). Arguably, Marshall alluded to abandonment in Johnson v. M'lntosh. 
106 Law and History Review, Spring 2001 
Formally, then, describing Indian title as amounting to "only a tenancy 
at sufferance" is misleading, since under M 'Intosh the Indians could remain 
on their land, and refuse to sell, as long as they remained peaceful. Mar-
shall specifically deemed them "rightful occupants," the antithesis of ten-
ants at sufferance, whom the law distinguishes from trespassers only by 
the legality of their original entry. The opinion, doctrinally at least, casts 
Indians as term of year tenants, with full rights to renew, rather than as 
tenants at sufferance subject to immediate eviction. As a matter of realpoli-
tik, however, the sufferance label may be accurate, and later cases did erode 
Indian rights. 76 
As peculiar as Indian title seems in and of itself, even stranger is its 
coexistence with European title in Marshall's dual land tenure construct. 
Real property was still the centerpiece of the common law in 1823, and 
few common law doctrines were as deeply established as the idea that all 
titles were rooted in a unique sovereign, be it the Crown, a state, or the 
federal government. Marshall himself apparently found it most odd that, 
under this system of dual land tenure, European sovereigns could convey 
titles before they had extinguished Indian title, for he devoted almost half 
of his opinion to laying out the historical record that "our whole country 
had been granted by the crown while in the occupation of the Indians." Why 
did Marshall devote so much time to summarizing long historical practice? 
Why did he emphasize that grants of European title before extinguishment 
of Indian title were "understood by all," "exercised unifonnly," and extend-
ed "universal recognition" as legitimate?77 
After describing Indian migrations caused by settlers thinning the game population, he not-
ed that the "soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by 
its ancient inhabitants, was parceled out according to the will of the sovereign power." 
Johnson v. M'lntosh, 590-91 (emphasis added). 
76. Philip P. Frickey, "Marshaling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law," Harvard Law Review 107 (1993): 381, 386. In Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1954), the Court held tribes had no Fifth 
Amendment constitutional right to compensation for a taking of their title of occupancy. 
Payment is made at the pleasure of the United States government. This case seems to con-
tradict Johnson v. M'lntosh, since it permits extinguishment of Indian title without purchase, 
just conquest, or abandonment. At bottom, however, it merely shows that Johnson v. M 'Intosh 
was not decided on constitutional grounds. It also makes sense within Marshall's scheme 
of dual land tenure systems: there are no remedies "in the Courts of the United States" for 
rights based on Indian tenure, whether held by the plaintiffs in Johnson v. M'lntosh or the 
Indians in Tee-Hit-Ton. 
77. Johnson v. M'lntosh. 574-89. One scholar has argued that this extended discussion 
was no more than tracing the chain of the United States' title, complaining that the "Court 
spent an extravagant amount of time in establishing the principle that the ultimate title to 
land within the United States was held by the federal government as the successor-in-interest 
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C. Legal Basis for the M 'Intosh Rule: Custom 
The answer is tied to the basis for the holding in M 'Intosh: custom. Phras-
es like "understood by all," "exercised uniformly," and "universal recog-
nition" appeal to long-established practice, not to any specific constitution-
al, statutory, or common law rule. "Common practices, sanctioned by 
general usage, that cover .. . similar situations are what ... (in accordance 
with long usage) [is meant] by custom."78 
Basing customary law on a general, long-term statutory usage is admit-
tedly unusual; it ordinarily arises via long private practice, independent of 
formal rule creation by a public entity. A recent commentator cogently 
captures this anomaly, noting that Marshall "ground[ed] his decision in 
actual practice (i.e., custom) and positive law (i.e., the long line of colo-
nial statutes)." While most customary legal rules may have arisen from 
entirely unofficial acts, drawing on old statutes for customary law is (per-
haps surprisingly) quite consistent with the rationale behind English cus-
tomary law. "The theory of the English law was that, if there had been a 
usage from time immemorial ... it might fairly be presumed that it arose 
under an act of Parliament or other public act of governing power, the best 
evidence of which had perished." The Supreme Court articulated the same 
view only nine years after M 'Intosh: 
[C]ustom .. . is always presumed to have been adopted with the consent of 
those who may be affected by it. In England, and in the states of this union 
which have no written constitution, it is the supreme law; always deemed to 
have its origin in an act of a state legislature ... The court not only may, but 
are [sic] bound to notice and respect general customs and usage as the law 
of the land, equally with the written law, and, when clearly proved, they will 
control the general law; this necessarily follows from its presumed origin,-
an act of parliament or a legislative act. 
This theory, that custom evidences ancient and lost legislative will, dove-
tails well with Marshall's blithe response to the possibility that the rele-
vant Virginia colonial statute barring private purchases had lapsed. He 
considered the later reenactment of a similar provision "as an unequivocal 
to the discovery by England." Henderson, "Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title," 90. 
Marshall focused, however, on the fact that various grants were made while the Indians 
occupied the lands, rather than on the legitimacy of each transfer. He adverted to grants made 
"notwithstanding the occupancy of the Indians," or "while in the occupation of the Indians," 
no less than nine times in the course of discussing the history of the dual land tenure re-
gime in America. 
78. Richard A. Epstein, "The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Cus-
tom in the Law of Tort," Journal of Legal Studies 21 (1992): 3, 6. 
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affinnance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle which had always 
been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians re-
sided in the government." Marshall seemed to say that the longstanding 
customary legislative practice of barring private purchases of Indian title 
was so strong that it overrode the "mere technicality" of a lapsed or repealed 
statute. 
This is a strong form of customary law, which is usually subordinate to 
explicit statutory formalities. Marshall displayed a similarly strong defer-
ence to custom in response to the plaintiffs' argument that the enactment 
of the numerous statutes barring private purchases (discussed at length 
above) showed that the background (common law) rule, absent such stat-
utes, was that such purchases were valid. He enlisted the very existence of 
these statutes to make the case for a customary rule of law: "the fact that 
such acts have been generally passed, is strong evidence of the general 
opinion, that such purchases are opposed by the soundest principles of 
wisdom and national policy." Universal, uniform, long-standing legislation 
added up to a customary rule greater than its statutory parts.79 
That said, Marshall did not even hint that Congress was powerless to 
reverse his opinion by statue and pennit private citizens to buy land directly 
from the Indians; there is no evidence that M 'Intosh created a constitutional 
rule. Reading M'lntosh as decided on customary grounds is consistent with 
the general ability of parties to contract around customary laws. "[C) us tom 
is best understood as setting out the 'right' default provisions, not as cre-
ating a body of mandatory rules."8° 
Marshall was not troubled that different rules might apply elsewhere in 
the British empire, also consistent with a customary Jaw reading of 
M'Jntosh. In Britain, custom was usually local (applying only to a manor, 
village, parish, or similarly small group). On precisely such parochial 
grounds, Marshall dismissed the relevance of the Camden-Yorke Opinion 
(approving of private purchases of land in India) relied on so heavily by 
the original members of the United Companies. Without explaining why 
America should have a different rule, Marshall merely noted that the Opin-
ion referred to "princes or governments," terms "usually applied to the East 
Indians, but not to those of North America. We speak of their sachems, their 
warriors, their chiefmen, their nations or tribes, not of their 'princes or 
governments."' Marshall admitted that the Camden-Yorke Opinion stood 
79. Charles F. Hobson, ed., Papers of John Marsha/19:279-84; Graham v. Walker. 61 A. 
98, 99 (Conn. 1905); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 714-15 (1832). 
Johnson v. M'lntosh, 585,604. 
80. Richard A. Epstein, "International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law 
as Sources of Property Rights in News," Virginia Law Review 78 ( 1992): 85, 87 n.6. 
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for the proposition that "the king's subjects carry with them the common 
law wherever they may form settlements." Although the common law gen-
erally permitted purchases of foreign lands, Marshall's opinion implies that 
customary practice in America created an exception to this rule. He argued 
that the system of dual land tenure had been "adapted to the actual condi-
tion of the two people" and was "indispensable to that system under which 
the country has been settled." Such an essential practice, Marshall said, 
"cannot be rejected by Courts of justice." Not only was the custom of bar-
ring private purchases from the Indians immune to legislative lapse, it was 
wholly beyond the power of common law courts to alter.81 
Admittedly, early American courts rarely recognized custom as a basis 
for law; until a modem resurgence, "'custom' had almost no authority in 
American law."82 In M'lntosh, Marshall never invokes the word custom, 
yet the passages from the opinion cited above show that it is a recurrent 
theme underlying the holding of the case. Given the long and uninterrupt-
ed line of statutes in every colony, it was probably unthinkable to Marshall, 
the other Justices, and most Americans, that private citizens could purchase 
land directly from the Indians. We have seen abundant evidence that the 
customary norm behind the M 'Intosh rule ran deep. 
Chancellor Kent described the basis for Marshall's opinion in words that 
support our customary reading: "[The M'lntosh rule] is established by 
numerous compacts, treaties, laws, and ordinances, and founded on imme-
morial usage. The country has been colonized and settled, and is now held 
by that title. It is the law of the land, and no court of justice can permit the 
right to be disturbed by speculative reasonings on abstract rights."83 • 
We find further support for custom as the basis of Marshall's holding by 
using the process of elimination: all other possibilities are either explicit-
ly contradicted by, or implicitly dissonant with, Marshall's opinion. The 
discussion above highlighted Marshall's rejection of both statutory and 
common law bases for the rule of M 'Intosh. He flatly rejected both natu-
ral and international law, defending the rule against private purchases from 
Indians "however this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to 
the usages of civilized nations ... " From the previous discussion of the 
discovery rule, itself clearly an element of international law, it was already 
clear that a different set of rules regulated relations between Europeans and 
Indians. He declared that domestic law (of unspecified source) must de-
cide property cases. 
81. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 591-92, 600. 
82. Carol Rose, "The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Propeny," University of Chicago Law Review 53 ( 1986): 711, 717 (footnote omit-
ted). 
83. James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, Pan VI, Lecture LI (emphasis added). 
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As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be 
acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into question; as the title 
to lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of 
the nation in which they lie; it will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to 
examine, not singly those principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of 
all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are ad-
mitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations, whose 
perfect independence is acknowledged; but those principles also which our 
own government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule 
for our decision. 84 
In extensive, apologetic dicta, Marshall offered "excuse, if not justifi-
cation" for refusing to extend intra-European civility to the Indians in the 
form of equal treatment under natural or international law. While natural 
or international law usually required a conqueror to integrate the defeated 
population into its own and extend them equal property rights, Marshall 
claimed that an agricultural and industrial society simply could not incor-
porate hunters like the Indians. He refused to justify this less favorable 
treatment on the theory that "agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, 
have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they 
possess, or to contract their limits," deeming irrelevant such "speculative 
opinions ... respecting the original justice of the [Europeans'] claim."85 
The reporter classified the case as "Constitutional Law" without elabo-
ration. Although it is possible to imagine the M'Intosh plaintiffs invoking, 
for instance, the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause, they do not 
mention either, nor does the Court. There is not a single reference to the 
United States Constitution. Joseph Cotton maintained that the opinion "es-
tablishes the constitutional power of the United States to dispose of all 
vacant lands, not within any state, free of any Indian titles or rights of 
ownership." Yet he provides no explanation for labeling this a constitutional 
power, and Marshall never discusses, for instance, the enumerated powers 
of Congress or the president. Finally, as discussed above, Marshall never 
suggested that Congress was powerless to reverse his decision and permit 
private citizens to purchase land directly from the Indians. It is thus difficult 
to argue that M'lntosh is a constitutional case, at least as the term is com-
monly used. 86 
84. Johnson v. M'fntosh, 572-73, 591-92. Marshall seemed to define international law 
as in large part a subspecies of natural law. He said he was rejecting "principles of abstract 
justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and 
which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations." 
85. Ibid., 588-89. 
86. Ibid., 543 (case header). The reporter, Wheaton, may have used the constitutional la-
bel to refer to international law cases. In the same volume, he classified a case involving 
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III. Efficient Expropriation 
From an economic perspective, it is unsurprising that colonizing Europe-
ans had adopted a rule barring private purchases of Indian lands. A free 
market inevitably would have led to bidding wars for desirable Indian lands. 
While some colonists might have favored an unfettered market for Indian 
land, Europeans as a group would have been the losers since Indians would 
have extracted higher prices for their acreage. Under the plausible assump-
tion that Europeans gave little if any weight to Indian welfare, it was col-
lectively efficient for Europeans to make their governments the only legal 
entities empowered to buy Indian land. Single buyers (monopsonists) can 
drive prices down just as single sellers (monopolists) can drive prices up. 
The M'lntosh rule was an attractive way to create a monopsony because 
it was administratively cheap. It required no soldiers, diplomats, complex 
administrative proceedings, or expensive record keeping. Any private par-
ty foolish enough to buy land directly from the Indians had a deed worth-
less in the eyes of American law. Note, too, that the plaintiffs in M'lntosh, 
holders under an Indian deed, bore the cost of commencing suit. After the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision, potential buyers of Indian lands 
got the message. There is no record of subsequent attempts by private par-
ties to purchase land directly from a tribe. 
The monopsony affirmed by M'lntosh clearly had a deleterious effect 
on the Indians. Like consumers in a nation without antitrust laws, they 
suffered economic harm at the hands of those better able to act collusive-
ly. In light of this long-term harm to all Indians, it is ironic that the Illi-
nois and Piankashaw tribes were the only real winners to come out of the 
case. The plaintiffs saw their Indian deeds declared worthless. The defen-
dant Mcintosh simply retained title to acreage he purchased from the United 
States. The tribes, however, sold the land twice and retained the proceeds 
from both sales. Marshall declined to order the tribes to make restitution 
to the plaintiffs, despite the fact that they sold the same land to the United 
States that they had sold to the plaintiffs' predecessors fifty-odd years ear-
lier. This may be yet another indication of the importance that the Court 
property rights of foreign nationals as constitutional. Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). Joseph P. 
Cotton, ed., The Constitutional Decisions of John Marshall ( 1905; reprint, New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1969), 2: I. Cotton appears unreli'able, asserting that the plaintiffs "had long been 
in undisputed possession and enjoyment of the land ... " This assertion in the record was 
clearly a fiction required by the common law action of ejectment. Frickey argues that Johnson 
v. M'/ntosh was a "quasi-constitutional" decision, meaning that although it did not bar leg-
islation to the contrary, it established a clear statement rule requiring Congress to be explicit 
about any further erosion of Indian rights. Frickey, "Marshaling Past and Present," 385. 
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attached to the rule against private purchases of Indian lands. Marshall's 
implicit suggestion that the plaintiffs ask the Indians for restitution was 
disingenuous. The decision maintained America's monopsony by denying 
any remedy to grantees under Indian deeds. 
The monopsony created by M'Intosh and the long line of equivalent stat-
utes and executive orders preceding the case (and providing the basis for 
the decision itselt) were but one cog in a great machine of efficient con-
quest. In addition to stifling other bids, European and American negotia-
tors systematically used bargaining tricks and the threat of force to further 
reduce the price paid for Indian lands. Such threats were credible because 
of steep declines in tribal populations, drastically reducing the number of 
warriors the Indians could muster. The precipitous depopulation occurred 
not from battles and massacres, but rather because European frontier settlers 
(i) thinned the forests and the game within the forests on which Indians 
depended for food and other necessities, and (ii) spread lethal diseases, such 
as smallpox, for which Indians had no inherited resistance. American lead-
ers were well aware of these low-cost means of reducing tribal populations. 
They passed many well-known measures, such as the Preemption Acts and 
the later Homestead Acts, to lure settlers to the frontier where they would 
inevitably thin the forests and game and spread infectious diseases among 
border tribes. The monopsony rule of M'lntosh, then, is but one facet (al-
beit an important piece) of the Europeans' efficient expropriation of Indi-
an lands. 
We can make further generalizations from the rule of M'lntosh. An im-
portant element of efficient expropriation was presenting a united front to 
the Indians in negotiations and military operations as well as in economic 
relations. The importance of this broader united front suggests a novel in-
terpretation of the Cherokee Nation and Worcester cases that, together with 
M'lntosh, comprise the "Marshall trilogy" on Indian law. Focusing on 
sympathetic dicta, many scholars have suggested that these cases embod-
ied a sympathetic and fair-minded approach to dealing with the Indians that 
later opinions overlooked. Frickey argues that, while Marshall's M'lntosh 
opinion may have legitimized unsavory colonialism in past events, taken 
together with Cherokee Nation and Worcester, it shows an attempt to soft-
en colonialism with constitutional-style rules that limited the ability of the 
other branches to exploit the Indians. He reads the Marshall trilogy as an 
implicit message to the other branches of government and the nation that 
they "should help those poor Indians." Newmyer concurs, arguing that 
Worcester offered Chief Justice Marshall and the Court "a chance to soft-
en the harshness of Mcintosh and perhaps even put the Court and its law 
on the side of morality." Based on private letters and other sources, New-
myer concludes that Marshall "was personally gratified to soften the im-
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pact of Mcintosh, and to harmonize the law of the land with his personal 
feelings about Native Americans."87 
Whatever Marshall pontificated about in his, as usual, extensive dicta, 
the holdings of the two cases clearly served the purpose of maintaining a 
united front in Indian relations. Cherokee Nation held that the Supreme 
Court did not have original jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by Indians since 
they were not the type of foreign "State" contemplated in the Supreme 
Court's grant of original jurisdiction in the Constitution. By deeming In-
dian tribes "domestic dependent nations," Marshall ensured that neither 
foreign powers nor any of the several states would meddle in Indian affairs. 
And Worcester held, under the clear language of the Constitution (revers-
ing the Articles of Confederation), that the state of Georgia had no power 
to deal directly with the tribes in its borders. By preserving a unitary enti-
ty to deal with the Indians, Marshall's opinion helped the United States 
continue to present a united political, military, and economic front, facili-
tating low-cost acquisition of Indian lands.88 
IV. Conclusion 
This thesis, that the implicit but overarching purpose of theM' Intosh rule 
against private purchases of Indian land was cheap acquisition of Indian 
lands, is consistent with the historical discussion in Part 1. The unwaver-
ing opposition of administrators and legislators to private purchases from 
the very beginning of European colonization, even in the face of intense 
87. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831 ); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515 ( 1832); Frickey, "Marshaling Past and Present," 424; R. Kent Newmyer, "Chief 
Justice John Marshall's Last Campaign: Georgia, Jackson, and the Cherokee Cases," Jour-
nal of Supreme Court History 23 (1999): 86, 92. 
88. U.S. Constitution, Article III, sec. 2; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 17 ("it may 
well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of 
the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more 
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to 
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of posses-
sion when their right of possession ceases"). While President Jackson's infamous refusal to 
enforce Marshall's decision is apocryphal, it is nevertheless true that his "administration 
worked in various ways to subvert the decision .. . . "Newmyer, "Marshall's Last Campaign," 
90. This at first blush appears to undermine the unifying, nationalist holding of Worcester v. 
Georgia. In fact Jackson's refusal to protect the Indians against the depredations of the 
Georgia state government may only indicate that the nation and its popular president ap-
proved of the state's policy and in effect relied on Georgia, as an agent, to further national 
policy. Marshall's decision gave the federal government the power to prevent state actions 
inconsistent with the national interest; Jackson merely chose not to exercise this power against 
Georgia. 
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lobbying and bribery by the United Companies and similar holders of In-
dian deeds, demonstrates that popularly elected officials felt the M'Intosh 
rule was quite valuable. It had little effect on the distribution of wealth 
among Europeans; its value must have come from its negative effect on 
Indian welfare. The willingness of the courts to reaffirm the rule against 
private purchases in a case where jurisdiction was questionable at best in-
dicates the importance officials continued to attach to the rule. The plain-
tiffs, as shareholders of companies that assembled significant capital to 
attempt such private purchases, demonstrated that the danger of bidding 
for Indian lands was not theoretical. 
This thesis is also consistent with the strategy of Chief Justice Marshall's 
opinion. He declined to decide the case on narrow statutory grounds, choos-
ing instead to rely on universal American custom to lay down a rule that 
would declare, once and for all, the illegitimacy of private purchases of 
Indian lands. Even the limited property rights Marshall recognized in the 
tribes served the ends of efficient expropriation: by requiring purchasers 
and squatters to delay settlement until the United States purchased Indian 
land, the M'/ntosh rule helped minimize conflict that was a relatively ex-
pensive means (in dollars and lives) of obtaining land. 
The efficient expropriation hypothesis helps reconcile the discordant 
history of European treatment of American Indians. There can be no doubt 
that European colonizers expropriated North America with full knowledge 
of the effect on Indians. Yet battles and massacres were extraordinarily rare, 
and some leading modern scholars argue that America treated the tribes, 
at least relatively speaking, with humanity.89 The history behind M'lntosh, 
and Marshall's opinion, provides support for the intermediate thesis that 
European policymakers harbored neither enmity nor charity for the Indi-
ans. The colonizers simply wanted to obtain tribal lands cheaply. The rule 
of "the great case of Johnson v. M'Intosh," by stifling bidding for Indian 
land by entities like the United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies, 
played an important role in the process of efficient expropriation. 
89. Don Russell, "How Many Indians Were Killed?," American West42 (July 1973): 63; 
Cohen, "Original Indian Title," 34 ("[w]e are probably the one great nation in the world that 
has consistently sought to deal with an aboriginal population on fair and equitable terms. 
We have not always succeeded in this effort but our deviations have not been typical"); 
Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, 248 (citing statutes and treaties 
evidencing attempt by nation to treat Indians fairly). 
The Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh 115 
APPENDIX 
This appendix explains the derivation of the map, reproduced above (68), show-
ing the United Illinois and Wabash Companies' claims alongside William Mcin-
tosh's purchases. There is no doubt about Mcintosh's lands; the difficulty lies in 
delineating the United Companies' tracts. It is impossible to reconstruct these par-
cels precisely from the metes and bounds descriptions contained in the Compa-
nies' deeds and reproduced in the Supreme Court's opinion. While some of the land-
marks survive (e.g., rivers), others are lost in the mists of history (e.g., "Crab Tree 
Plains," "a remarkable place known by the name of the Big Buffalo Hoofs," or a 
"certain remarkable place, being the ground on which a battle was fought, about 
forty or fifty years before that time, between the Pewaria and Renard Indians"). In 
addition, the size of the unit of measure used in the deeds, the league, was not well 
defined.90 
The map follows the United Companies' claims as drawn by Clarence Alvord, 
the leading historian of Illinois during the early 1900s. Alvord does not explain how 
he derived his map.91 That said, it is consistent with those portions of the metes and 
bounds description (the rivers and a few other landmarks, like Point Coupee on the 
Wabash River) that can still be identified. Further, it is consistent with the propor-
tions given in the Indian deed descriptions: the Wabash Company tracts extend about 
a third farther eastward into Indiana than they do westward into Illinois. 
Maps from the era of the purchases purporting to show the tracts are clearly 
erroneous. A map drawn in 1791 represents each company's purchase as one tract 
instead of two, and the proportions of the Wabash tract are distorted (six times larger 
on the Illinois side of the Wabash River than on the Indiana side; the deed states 
that the tract is one-third wider on the Indiana side). Another contemporary map 
made similar errors.92 Interestingly, the errors in these maps, showing the Wabash 
Company tracts extending much further into Illinois than they did, may have fooled 
90. Definitions of a league ranged from a little over two miles to three miles. "General 
Harmar used 22 leagues as about 50 miles." Francis S. Philbrick, ed., Law of the Indiana 
Territory, 1801-1809 (Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library 21, Law Series 2, 
1930), lxx n.3. "The league was a rather indefinite measurement, usually considered to be 
about three miles in length." Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, 7:53 (Secretary 
of War Dearborn to William Henry Harrison, June 17, 1802). 
91. Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, vol. 2, frontispiece. Alvord briefly 
discussed the difficulties determining the northern Illinois Company tract, confessing that 
"[t]he boundaries of the tract on the Illinois River are impossible to trace." Ibid., 203 n.375. 
The Companies themselves admitted that the description of this tract had serious flaws. 
Minutes of the United Companies, 14, 18. 
92. The United States of America Laid down From the best Authorities Agreeable to the 
Peace of 1783 (1. Norman, Boston, 1791) (Osgood Carleton, mapmaker) (Library of Con-
gress, Map Section, 03700 1791 .C3 VAULT); A Map of the Northern and Middle States 
(Amos Doolittle, New Haven, 1789) (Library of Congress, Map Section, 03300 1789 .D6 
VAULT). This map shows the Illinois side of the Wabash Company tracts as three times their 
Indiana side. 
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the parties to M'Intosh, and the courts, into believing that there was a real contro-
versy in the case. Of course, the briefest examination of the metes and bounds 
description of the tracts reveals this error, making it clear that neither the defen-
dant nor the courts made any serious effort to verify the plaintiffs' claims of a live 
dispute. Given these conspicuous errors, the impossibility of reproducing the grants 
directly from the metes and bounds descriptions in the deeds, and Alvord's repu-
tation for careful scholarship, his work seems like the most reliable map of the 
United Companies' tracts. 
